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I.   INTRODUCTION 
 This Article will examine whether a legal system with a jurispru-
dence of law and economics can establish a moral duty to obey the 
law. It is assumed that a jurisprudential system of law and econom-
ics is wealth-maximizing.1 If the jurisprudence can also be found to 
command a moral duty to obey the law, then a legal system has been 
established that simultaneously answers two of the most fundamen-
tal issues in society. This investigation limits its scope of wealth-
maximizing legal systems to two schools of “free market” law and 
economics—the Chicago and Austrian schools. Part II of this Article 
determines that the most effective methodology to establish a moral 
duty to obey the law measures the procedural assurances of substan-
                                                                                                                     
 * J.D., Florida State University, May 2007; B.S., Neuroscience, Bates College; e-
mail: dbearlaw@gmail.com. I would like to thank Professors Nathan A. Adams and Fer-
nando Tesón for their instruction and guidance; Rachel Smith, Luke McCarthy, Megan 
Reynolds, and the FSU Law Review for their editorial work; and my friends and family for 
their encouragement and support. 
 1. While the two systems covered in this investigation most likely are not both per-
fectly wealth-maximizing, it is assumed that they, at least, both greatly increase wealth. 
This Article will not question each school’s assertion that it is wealth-increasing. 
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tive justice. This methodology was recently developed by Randy Bar-
nett.2 Part III of this Article establishes substantive justice through 
the natural rights3 recognized by the philosophy of classical liberal-
ism, the protection of which will establish substantive justice.4 Fi-
nally, Part IV evaluates the policies of the two law and economics 
schools to determine the level of procedural protection they would 
provide for those natural rights as a jurisprudence. 
II.   ESTABLISHING A MORAL DUTY TO OBEY THE LAW 
 Political theologians have long understood that it is desirable to 
escape the chaos and uncertainty that human nature makes inherent 
in the state of nature. The desirability of escaping the state of nature 
is the premise of Thomas Hobbes’5 and John Locke’s6 classic works, 
and earlier philosophers such as Aristotle would not even concede 
that an individual could exist outside the politic.7 As characterized by 
Locke, being outside the state of nature allows one to stop building 
fences and start sowing farms.8 In essence, moving outside the state 
of nature is desirable because it provides security and maximizes 
                                                                                                                     
 2. RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF 
LIBERTY (Princeton Univ. Press 2004). Randy E. Barnett is the Carmack Waterhouse Pro-
fessor of Legal Theory at the Georgetown University Law Center. He is also a senior fellow 
at the Cato Institute.  
 3. For purposes of simplicity, this Article will specifically address the views of natu-
ral rights held by John Locke, hereinafter referred to as Lockean Natural Rights. Any in-
ference from these natural rights will be informed by the philosophy of classical liberalism. 
 4. Classical liberalism is a philosophy of the Enlightenment era that is founded upon 
the principle of individual liberty. Many philosophers and theologians contributed to the 
intellectual foundation of the natural rights of classical liberalism, but prominent among 
them were John Locke, David Hume, Adam Smith, Immanuel Kant, Thomas Jefferson and, 
more recently, Robert Nozick. See generally DAVID BOAZ, LIBERTARIANISM: A PRIMER 16, 56-7 
(The Free Press 1997) (describing the key concepts of classical liberalism and how the philoso-
phy of classical liberalism has come to be closely aligned with today’s libertarianism). 
 5. On the state of nature, Hobbes wrote that:  
In such condition, there is no place for Industry; because the fruit thereof is 
uncertain: and consequently no Culture of the Earth; no Navigation, nor use of 
the commodities that may be imported by Sea … no Arts; no Letters; no Soci-
ety; and which is worst of all, continuall feare, and danger of violent death; And 
the life of man, solitary, poore, nasty, brutish, and short. . . .  
THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 89 (Rev. Student ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1996) (1651). 
On the need to remove oneself from the state of nature, Hobbes wrote that: “The finall 
Cause, End or Designe of men . . . is the foresight of their own preservation, and of a more 
contented life thereby; that is to say, of getting themselves out from that miserable condi-
tion of Warre . . . . ” Id. at 117. 
 6. Locke’s picture of the landscape of human interaction in the state of nature was 
not as dismal as Hobbes’, but he readily acknowledged a number of problems, such as the 
lack of dispassionate neutral arbitrators determining the extent to which a natural right 
was violated and demanded retribution. JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT §5-
§§ 7, 127 (Kessinger Publ’g 2004) (1690). 
 7. See HADLEY ARKEYS, FIRST THINGS: AN INQUIRY INTO THE FIRST PRINCIPLES OF 
MORALS AND JUSTICE 11-30 (1986). 
 8. LOCKE, supra note 6, at § 123. 
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utility. Almost all political philosophers acknowledge that the only 
way to escape the state of nature is through a government which has 
some method to enforce compliance with laws and some degree of 
centralization.9 The key motivation and revelation of Hobbes’ and 
Locke’s Enlightenment era scholarship was that there needed to be a 
moral justification to remove an individual from the state of nature 
and into this governmental order. If there is such a moral justifica-
tion, then each individual has a moral duty to obey the law. 
 A reason to obey the law can be either prudential or moral. A pru-
dential reason to obey the law is simply because doing so is in one’s 
own best interest.10 A moral reason to obey the law is because one 
has an intrinsic philosophical reason to do so.11 
 Prudential reasons to obey the law do not prescribe a moral duty 
upon the individual and, hence, need no moral justifications.12 For 
example, if the law dictates that one cannot drive more than fifty-five 
miles per hour upon penalty of a ticket, then he may decide to drive 
below fifty-five miles per hour if he determines that the risk of get-
ting a ticket is great enough. But he would have no moral duty to do 
this; it is simply a rational choice of self-interest. As a prudential 
reason to obey the law was never sufficient for Locke or Hobbes, it is 
also insufficient for purposes of this Article.13 
 A moral reason to obey the law assigns an intrinsically binding 
duty upon the individual. Perhaps the most common reason to obey 
the law is legal positivism.14 A strict legal positivist believes that a 
government gains legitimacy over individuals simply by being sover-
eign over them.15 In order to be sovereign over individuals, citizens 
have to be in a habit of obedience to the government and that gov-
ernment must not be in a habit of obedience to a determinant human 
                                                                                                                     
 9. The exceptions are anarcho-capitalists, such as David Friedman, who hold that 
private law, courts, and police are equally if not more capable of bringing individuals out of 
the state of nature. DAVID FRIEDMAN, THE MACHINERY OF FREEDOM: GUIDE TO A RADICAL 
CAPITALISM 114-26 (Open Court 2d ed. 1989); see BRUCE L. BENSON, THE ENTERPRISE OF 
LAW: JUSTICE WITHOUT THE STATE 349-78 (1990); BRUCE L. BENSON, TO SERVE AND 
PROTECT: PRIVATIZATION AND COMMUNITY IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE  73-318 (1998). See gener-
ally ANARCHY AND THE LAW: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF CHOICE (Edward P. Stringham 
ed., 2007) (specifially, articles in Part I detail theories of and articles in Part IV detail his-
torical applications of anarchy and subscription-based law). 
 10. BRIAN BIX, JURISPRUDENCE THEORY AND CONTEXT 169 (Carolina Academic Press 
3d ed. 2004); N.E. SIMMONDS, CENTRAL ISSUES IN JURISPRUDENCE 23-24, 66 (Sweet & Max-
well Lmt. 1986).  
 11. See sources cited supra note 10. 
 12. See sources cited supra note 10. 
 13. See Hadley Arkes, News for the Libertarians: The Moral Tradition Already Con-
tains the Libertarian Premises, 29 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 61, 61 (2005) (“[B]eings who can 
give and understand reasons deserve to be ruled with a rendering of reasons . . . .”). 
 14. See SIMMONDS, supra note 10, at 77.  
 15. See JOHN AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED 193-213 (Pro-
methium Books 2000) (1832). 
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superior.16 Under a philosophy of pure positivism, the most ruthless 
dictators of recent history—Pol Pot, Joseph Stalin, and Saddam Hus-
sein—would command a moral duty of obedience.17 Such a theory is 
facially absurd, as is the idea that legal positivism establishes a 
moral duty to obey the law. 
A.   Legitimacy from Consent 
 Much of modern liberal philosophy, especially Western philoso-
phy, is premised on consent.18 Consent is powerful enough to turn a 
legal bad into a legal good and is certainly sufficient to establish a 
moral duty to obey the law. For example, consent is powerful enough 
to turn battery into boxing. That being the case, the ideal method of 
establishing a moral duty to obey the law is through an individual’s 
own consent to be governed by that law. Sir William Blackstone ex-
presses this idea clearly: “[N]o subject of England can be constrained 
to pay any aids or taxes, even for the defence of the realm or the sup-
port of government, but such as are imposed by his own consent, or 
that of his representatives in parliament.”19 
 Due to the vast power of consent, if there is consent to be gov-
erned, then one can consent to give up, or alienate, one’s rights.20 As 
                                                                                                                     
 16. Id. 
 17. See generally F.A. HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY 236-46 (1960) (arguing 
that by removing all contraints on what government can legitimately do, legal positivism 
clears the way for facism). 
 18. Leslie Green, Law and Obligation, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF JURISPRUDENCE 
AND PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 514, 525 (Jules Coleman & Scott Shapiro eds., 2004) (referencing 
PATRICK RILEY, WILL AND POLITICAL LEGITIMACY (1982)); see JULIUS STONE, THE 
PROVINCE AND FUNCTION OF LAW 222 (Williams S. Hein & Co. Inc. 1968).  
 19. 1 SIR WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 2 COMMENTARIES *135 (Chicago: The Univ. of Chi-
cago Press 1979) (1765). See generally Chrisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (Dall.) 419 (1793). 
“[T]he basis of sound and genuine jurisprudence; laws derived from the pure source of 
equality and justice must be founded on the CONSENT of those, whose obedience they re-
quire.” Id. at 458 (Wilson, J., concurring) (comment made in the context of determining 
that the source of the United States’ authority is the popular sovereignty of the people, not 
authorization from the states). Modern jurisprudence has determined that this constitu-
tional doctrine was overturned by the Eleventh Amendment. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 
(1999); Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996). But see John F. Manning, The Elev-
enth Amendment and the Reading of Precise Constitutional Torts, 113 YALE L.J. 1633 
(2004); Randy E. Barnett, The People of the State?: Chrisholm v. Georgia and Popular Sov-
ereignty, Expresso Preprint Series Working Paper 2014, available at 
http://law.bepress.com/expresso/eps/2014. 
 20. Although one can alienate his rights, many liberal Western philosophers maintain 
that the power of consent does not extend to consenting to slavery. See JOHN STUART MILL, 
ON LIBERTY 120 (Cosimno 2005) (1859) (presenting a utilitarian reason against voluntary 
slavery); see also RANDY E. BARNETT, THE STRUCTURE OF LIBERTY: JUSTICE AND THE RULE 
OF LAW 78-80 (Oxford Univ. Press 1998) [hereinafter BARNETT, STRUCTURE OF LIBERTY]; 
Randy E. Barnett, Contract Remedies and Inalienable Rights, 4 SOC. PHIL. & POL’Y 179 
(1986) (presenting a rights-based argument against voluntary slavery and forms of specific 
performance for personal service contracts. Barnett’s distinction is based upon the idea 
that one can alienate his acquired rights but not his inherent rights); Letter from Lysander 
Spooner to Thomas F. Bayard (May 27, 1882), in THE LYSANDER SPOONER READER 123, 
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long as the government acts within the rules which the individual 
has consented to, that government is not violating the individual’s 
natural rights.21 Therefore, if there is consent to be governed and the 
government is acting within the rules to which the individual has 
agreed, that individual has a moral duty to obey the law. 
 The most obvious method of consent to be governed would be ac-
tual consent. If an individual did actually consent to be governed by 
the law, then he would have a moral duty to obey that law. However, 
for the reasons explained below, no such consent is realistically pos-
sible in any large geographically-based government.22 The first of two 
possible methods of actual consent is where the individual physically 
consents to be governed.23 For example, an individual would be giving 
actual consent if, when he turned eighteen years old, he walked up to 
the National Archives Building in Washington, D.C. and signed an 
addendum to the Constitution. This, of course, is not realistic and is 
not observed in any national government today, so there is no actual 
consent through one’s own physical consent. The second method—
and also a frequently used argument for the current existence of ac-
tual consent—is that when a previous generation actually consents 
to be governed and thereby establishes for themselves a moral duty 
to obey the law, future generations are also consenting and have a 
moral duty to obey the law. This is a type of agency theory. However, 
because no form of agency theory accepts that an agent can agree to 
bind someone not yet born, there is no actual consent by a current 
generation that has been established by a past generation.24 
 Another potentially legitimate method of consent is implied con-
sent. Implied consent means that even though one has not explicitly 
consented to be governed, one’s actions have implied that consent.25 
The most common arguments for why individuals have implicitly 
consented to be governed are that they have participated in the vot-
ing process, that they have continued to reside in a jurisdiction, and 
                                                                                                                     
123-24 (1992). But see ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 331 (Basic Books 1974) 
(supporting a rights-based argument for voluntary slavery). Of note, Locke would not have ac-
cepted that one could negotiate himself into slavery. See LOCKE, supra note 6, at § 23. 
 21. See infra notes 66-79 and accompanying text. 
 22. All governments in our world’s history have been geographically based. By this I 
mean that the nation is comprised of all land within certain borders. As is explained later, 
this makes consent impractical if not impossible. A nongeographically based government, 
however, could realistically have truly voluntary actual consent. However, even in geo-
graphically based nations, actual consent is given by many government officials, voluntary 
immigrants, and armed forces members. Id.  
 23. Philosophers of law rarely talk about actual consent to the law as a practical justi-
fication for a moral duty to obey the law. This is not because such consent would not be 
productive but, rather, because it is unrealistic.  
 24. See BIX, supra note 10, at 136; DAVID HUME, SELECTED ESSAYS OF THE ORIGINAL 
CONTRACT 279 (Oxford Univ. Press 1993). 
 25. See AUSTIN, supra note 15, at 527-28.  
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that they have paid taxes in that jurisdiction.26 All of these argu-
ments, though, fail. 
 Those who argue that voting provides an implied consent to be 
governed reason that by voting one is injecting himself into the gov-
erning process and, hence, taking ownership of it. If the voter’s can-
didate or position wins, then he is obligated to follow the rules which 
his candidate imposes upon others. If one’s candidate or position 
loses, then he is obligated to accept the result of the process in which 
he has voluntarily participated. If one does not vote, then he has vol-
untarily chosen inaction and must accept the outcome.27  
 The fatal flaw in this logic is that the voter is not voluntarily tak-
ing part in the election. The voter is not acting voluntarily because 
there is no way for him to not act.28 If the individual votes, then one 
is said to consent, but if he refrains from voting, he will be said to 
have assented to the result through a lack of protest.29 Because it is 
not consent if one cannot say “no,” voting cannot amount to an indi-
vidual’s consent to be governed. Voting could only be considered con-
sent if an individual could withhold his consent by choosing not to 
vote. But even then, if withholding consent only meant not being 
held to the whims of the elected winner—in such policies as taxes—
would the individual truly be voluntarily consenting. If, instead, the 
individual who withholds his vote was still at the whim of the major-
ity’s tax policy, then voting is a form of self-defense, not consent, just 
as shooting a man who is running at you with a knife is self-defense, 
not murder.30  
 Those who argue that residence in a jurisdiction provides an im-
plied consent to be governed by a sovereign reason that by choosing 
not to leave a jurisdiction, an individual is choosing to live under its 
laws.31 Residing in a sovereign jurisdiction is a voluntary choice to be 
bound by the decisions of the sovereign and hence prescribes a moral 
duty to obey the laws of that jurisdiction. The fundamental flaw with 
this reasoning is that it assumes the sovereign has the initial author-
ity to demand consent from an individual in order for that individual 
                                                                                                                     
 26. Id.  
 27. See 1 JOHN PLAMENATZ, MAN AND SOCIETY: A CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF SOME 
IMPORTANT SOCIAL AND POLITICAL THEORIES FROM MACHIAVELLI TO MARX 240 (Longman 
1963). 
 28. An individual’s action is not voluntary if he cannot choose to not do it. 
 29. HERBERT SPENCER, SOCIAL STATICS 318-28 (Adamant Media Corp. 2000) (1892). 
 30. LYSANDER SPOONER, NO TREASON: THE CONSTITUTION OF NO AUTHORITY 31, 38-
39 (Pine Tree Press 1966) (1870). 
 31. Notably, John Locke took the position that residence established a duty to obey 
the law, although he used the term “legitimacy of government.” LOCKE, supra note 6, at § 
119. While this Article adopts Locke’s theory of Natural Rights, it does not adopt his theory 
of establishing of a duty to obey the law. Furthermore, while Locke is a key figure in the 
development of classical liberalism, his theory of residence has not been adopted by the 
majority of classical liberal scholars. 
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to maintain his residence and his property rights to his land. This 
proposition is circular and has been called bootstrapping: A estab-
lishes authority over B by maintaining that B can only remain on his 
land by recognizing the authority of A.32 
 The residency-as-implied-consent argument further fails because 
of the extremely high costs of leaving one’s residence. Due to this 
high cost, it cannot be derived from an individual’s lack of moving 
that he is affirmatively stating that he is consenting to be governed.33 
Asking someone to give up his home, his heritage, his relationships 
with the community, and his job in order to say “no, I don't consent” 
is hardly a neutral proposition. Because saying “no” is such a costly 
option, the weight of the fact that the resident did not say no is 
greatly diminished. While this is a strong argument against any con-
sent value of maintaining residence, there would seem to be more 
consent value for one who moves to that jurisdiction. 
 Those who argue that paying taxes provides an implied consent to 
be governed reason that by providing the financial wherewithal for 
the government’s actions, one is effectively becoming a part of the 
government. The fatal flaw of this argument is, again, that since 
there is no way to say “no,” saying “yes” is not voluntary and, there-
fore, not consent. “The fact is that the government, like a highway-
man, says to a man: ‘Your money, or your life.’ And many, if not 
most, taxes are paid under the compulsion of that threat.”34 
 There is an additional argument that hypothetical consent to be 
governed establishes a moral duty to obey the law. Hypothetical con-
sent is said to be established when a rational person would consent 
to be governed.35 The most widely accepted version of hypothetical 
consent relies upon a test of when an individual who is blind to his 
particular circumstances in life—his intelligence, wealth, opportuni-
ties, et cetera would decide to consent to the laws.36 Whatever one 
may think of the merits of this test of legitimacy, because the consent 
is hypothetical, it is not any act of consent and does not morally bind 
                                                                                                                     
 32. BARNETT, supra note 2, at 18-19 (citing Lea Brilmayer, Consent, Contract, and 
Territory, 74 MINN. L. REV. 1, 10-13, 16 (1990)). 
 33. BARNETT, supra note 2, at 19, 41-42 (citing FRANK H. KNIGHT, FREEDOM AND 
REFORM: ESSAYS IN ECONOMICS AND SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY 419 (1982)); BIX, supra note 10, 
at 169; DAVID HUME, SELECTED ESSAYS OF THE ORIGINAL CONTRACT 283 (“Can we seriously 
say, that a poor peasant or artisan, has a free choice to leave his country, when he knows 
no foreign language or manners, and lives, from day to day, by the small wages which he 
acquires? We may as well assert that a mar, by remaining in a vessel, freely consents to 
the dominion of the master; though he was carried on board while asleep, and must leap 
into the ocean and perish [in order to avoid consenting].”). 
 34. SPOONER, supra note 30, at 17. 
 35. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971). 
 36. This is termed the “veil of ignorance.” Id. 
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as an act of consent would.37 Furthermore, it is virtually impossible 
for third parties to determine what conditions an individual would 
consent to. For example, Rawls’ veil of ignorance is afflicted by utter 
ignorance of individuals’ level of risk aversion or risk loving. 
 There is no actual or implied consent to be governed and, there-
fore, no consent-based moral duty to obey the law. The idea that 
there is consent is not simply false but also dangerous because it es-
tablishes a patina of legitimacy in the government no matter how 
abusive its laws.38 
B.   Legitimacy Without Consent 
 In addition to theories based upon of consent of the governed, 
there are theories that do not rely upon consent to establish a moral 
duty to obey the law.39 The strongest non-consent based arguments 
for establishing a moral duty to obey the law are that a moral duty 
arises from gratuity or fair play, that a moral duty arises only when 
individual laws are substantively just, and that a moral duty arises 
to the entire system to the extent that there are procedural safe-
guards assuring the justness of the laws the system produces.40 
                                                                                                                     
 37. See BIX, supra note 10, at 136-37; RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 
150-54 (1977) (discussing the very real distinction between Rawls’ hypothetical consent 
and actual consent); Tony Honore, The Social Contract Interpreted, in MAKING LAW BIND 
139, 154-55 (1987) (illustrating that while an actual contract can create new duties, a hy-
pothetical one does not except under bizarre circumstances); id. at 156-57 (delegitimizing 
the hypothetical contract because the hypothetical man is prevented from entering into 
any alternative which he might have preferred). 
 38. See BARNETT, supra note 2, at 43-45. 
 39. See MILL, supra note 20, at 119-39 (affirming that many of the following theories 
are not consent based); H.L.A. Hart, Are There Any Natural Rights?, 64 PHIL. REV. 175, 
185-86 (1955); John Rawls, Legal Obligation and the Duty of Fair Play, in LAW AND 
PHILOSOPHY 3, 10 (Sidney Hook ed., 1964).  
 40. There are also theories of legitimacy from the intrinsic value of democratic choice. 
E.g., Thomas Christiano, An Argument for Democratic Equality, in PHILOSOPHY AND 
DEMOCRACY 39 (Thomas Christiano ed., 2003) (generally arguing that the primary element 
of justice is met by giving each person an equal opportunity to dictate how society is organ-
ized. However, these choices are limited to “collective property,” and the scope of democ-
ratic choice can come into conflict with other elements of justice.); Joshua Cohen, Proce-
dure and Substance in Deliberative Democracy, in PHILOSOPHY AND DEMOCRACY, supra, at 
17 (arguing that in a society of reasonable pluralism—all western societies—legitimacy is 
met when democratic choices are made according to reasons that are compatible with every 
reasonable person’s moral code. The moral code must be based on terms that everyone can 
accept.); David Estlund, Beyond Fairness and Deliberation: The Epistemic Dimension of 
Democratic Authority, in  PHILOSOPHY AND DEMOCRACY, supra, at 69 (arguing that legiti-
macy is derived from a combination of fair, deliberative procedures and from decisions that 
are based on reasons that are not objectionable to any reasonable citizen). These theories 
are sophisticated and may deserve merit in an environment where consent is given. But 
without consent they do not provide legitimacy. E.g., GUIDO PINCIONE & FERNANDO TESÓN, 
RATIONAL CHOICE AND DEMOCRATIC DELIBERATION: A THEORY OF DISCOURSE FAILURE 219 
(2006); Richard J. Arneson, Democratic Rights at a National Level, in PHILOSOPHY AND 
DEMOCRACY, supra, at 95, 96-97. 
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1.   Gratuity and Fair Play 
 The refutation of the arguments for gratuity and fair play are 
similar, so they will be addressed at the same time. The theory of 
gratuity is that there is a moral duty to obey the law when an indi-
vidual receives benefits from another.41 By receiving the benefit, he 
incurs a debt of gratitude toward his benefactor.42 The theory of fair 
play is that the existence of a cooperative enterprise gives rise to a 
duty of obligation to the system.43 The typical benefit referred to is 
the generalized benefit that one receives from living in a prosperous 
society, not a direct benefit such as a transfer payment.44 The fatal 
flaw with these positions is that because the benefit is not asked for 
but instead forced upon the individual, gratuity and “returning the 
favor” are virtues, not legal obligations.45 It is not a normally recog-
nized legal principle that one may demand payment from another af-
ter unilaterally conferring a benefit upon that other person.46  
 The other relevant flaw of these theories is that in order for them 
to confer a moral duty, the recipients must either be active partici-
pants in the cooperative scheme or have contemplated the benefits 
and burdens of accepting the benefits along with the coinciding du-
ties.47 The reality is that most people have not “accepted” because 
they do not regard themselves as a part of a cooperative scheme and 
they have not contemplated and accepted the burdens that theoreti-
cally accompany the benefits. Receiving the generalized benefit of be-
ing a member of society is nothing that citizens ask for, voluntarily 
accept, or have the ability to reject. Individuals simply receive the 
benefit, and most often the recipients are either incapable of not tak-
ing advantage of the “societal benefit” or would have to go to great 
                                                                                                                     
 41. BIX, supra note 10, at 170; Plato, The Moral Obligation to Obey the Law, in 
PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 210, 213-18 (Joel Feinberg & Jules Coleman eds., 6th ed. 2000).  
 42. BIX, supra note 10, at 170; Plato, supra note 41, at 213-18. 
 43. Hart, supra note 39, at 185-86. “When any number of persons conduct any joint 
enterprise according to rules, and thus restrict their liberty, those who have submitted to 
those restrictions when required have a right to similar submission from those who have 
benefitted from their submission.” Id. at 185. “[T]here is a mutually beneficial and just 
scheme of social cooperation . . . [which] requires a certain sacrifice from each person . . . 
under these conditions a person who has accepted the benefit of the scheme is bound by a 
duty of fair play to do his part . . . .” Id.; see RAWLS, supra note 35, at 9-10. 
 44. See RAWLS, supra note 35, at 342-45, 347-48. 
 45. See generally JEREMY WALDRON, LAW AND DISAGREEMENT 214-19 (2004); Randy 
E. Barnett, A Law Professor’s Guide to Natural Law and Natural Rights, 20 HARV. J.L. & 
PUB. POL’Y 655, 666-78 (1997) [hereinafter Barnett, Law Professor’s Guide]; Randy E. Bar-
nett, A Consent Theory of Contract, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 269, 296-300 (1986) [hereinafter 
Barnett, Consent Theory]. These sources provide elaborations on the difference between le-
gally requiring behavior which is simply good versus legally requiring behavior which 
doesn’t violate others’ rights. 
 46. M.B.E. Smith, Is There a Prima Facie Obligation to Obey the Law?, 82 YALE L.J. 
950, 953-54 (1973). 
 47. A. John Simmons, The Principle of Fair Play, 8 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 307, 307-12 (1979). 
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lengths to avoid it.48 Since it is very difficult or impossible to reject 
these benefits, accepting them is not sufficient to establish a moral 
duty to obey the law.  
 Possibly the most important reality that undermines the theory of 
gratuity is that even when benefits are directly and voluntarily re-
ceived, because the government has monopolized the market by 
crowding out all other alternatives, there is no choice for individuals 
but to accept its services.49 So while one might accept the govern-
ment’s services of fire protection when the fire department puts out 
the fire in his backyard, it is precisely society’s rules which prohibit 
the existence of any other fire service which he could accept instead. 
Furthermore, when an individual has been forced to pay into a sys-
tem, it would be unreasonabe to ask him to turn away that service 
which he has already paid for. His acceptance of services for which 
he has already paid can hardly demonstrate that he owes a continu-
ing duty to the system. Finally, when other individuals are receiving 
subsidized services, to ask one to pay full price is to ask him to put 
himself at a competitive disadvantage, which in our competitive 
world is a huge obstacle.50 
 Even if the theories of gratuity and fair play were accepted, they 
would only apply to laws which, when followed, provide a benefit to 
the other members of society.51 For example, there would be no moral 
duty to wait at a red light of an empty intersection at 3:00 in the 
morning. One could owe a duty of reciprocity to others, but the law 
would have to actually grant individuals a benefit for that duty to be 
established. 
                                                                                                                     
 48. RAWLS, supra note 35, at 336, 344. 
 49. There is no reasonable option but to accept the benefit of public roads or po-
lice protection because through the use of force government has artificially crowded 
out any substitute. 
 50. For example, in the U.S. Supreme Court case Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic 
and Institutional Rights, 126 S. Ct. 1297 (2006), law schools wanted to establish their own 
standards for employers who could interview on campus. However, the U.S. government 
disagreed and demanded that the schools reflect the government’s standards upon pain of 
having federal grant money taken away. Because all law schools receive a significant 
amount of grant money from the U.S. government, it was virtually impossible for any 
school to disobey the government, as doing so would put it at a huge competitive disadvan-
tage with respect to every other law school. See Amicus Curiae Brief of the Cato Institute 
in Support of Respondents at 14-16, Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic and Institutional 
Rights, 126 S. Ct. 1297 (2006) (No. 04-1152). See generally Ayn Rand, The Question of 
Scholarship, THE OBJECTIVIST, June 1966, at 11, 15 (building off the logic that mandatory 
payment into the pool which funds those grants makes self-financing more difficult). 
 51. Smith, supra note 46. 
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2.    Substantive Justice à la Carte 
 The idea that a law is owed a duty of obedience only when it is 
substantially just has been in place since Thomas Aquinas.52 The 
theory is quite straightforward, and Aquinas says it best himself in 
stating that “[unjust laws] are acts of violence rather than laws . . . a 
law that is not just, seems to be no law at all.”53 In other words, a 
human positive law must not violate a law of justice.54 Broadly 
speaking, under such a system, a law only holds a moral duty of obe-
dience insofar as it is compatible with moral norms.55 The legitimacy 
of this method of jurisprudence is founded upon the understanding 
that, even absent consent of the parties, it is legitimate for govern-
ment to enforce the rights of individuals. Such a system would estab-
lish legitimacy but is not effective in furthering the purpose of gov-
ernment in bringing citizens out of the state of nature. The system 
fails to do this because it does not provide a method of resolving dis-
putes and, in practice, is not a functional system at all.56 This system 
would rely upon individuals determining the justness of each law 
they encounter and is really no different than the state of nature, as 
one of the main benefits of escaping the state of nature is that neu-
tral third parties preside over controversies.57 
3.   Systemwide Procedural Assurances of Substantive Justice 
 The method of establishing a moral duty to obey the law which 
this Article accepts and later utilizes to analyze justness of jurispru-
dential systems of law and economics is based upon systemic proce-
                                                                                                                     
 52. Thomas Aquinas lived in the thirteenth century and is widely considered the most 
influential natural law theorist. RAYMOND WACKS, UNDERSTANDING JURISPRUDENCE 17 
(Oxford Univ. Press 2005) His position is often summarized by the latin phrase lex iniusta 
non est lex (“an unjust law is no law at all”). See Norman Kretzmann, Lex Iniusta Non Est 
Lex: Laws on Trial in Aquinas’ Court of Conscience, 33 AM. J. JURIS. 99 (1998). 
 53. Brian Bix, Natural Law Theory, reprinted in PHILOSOPHY OF LAW, supra note 41, 
at 7, 9.  
 54. More accurately, according to Aquinas, human-created law is not law at all if it is 
incompatible with the natural law of justice. Edward J. Damich, The Essence of Law Ac-
cording to Thomas Aquinas, 30 AM. J. JURIS. 79, 81 (1985). 
 55. See generally JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS (Clarendon Press 
1980). A system of justice that relies on the protection of natural rights is a correctness 
theory of legitimacy, as opposed to procedural correctness. A major problem with this type 
of system is always that there is a disagreement over how to define “correct.” This dis-
agreement threatens to undermine the stability obtained from governance, which was a 
primary reason to leave the state of nature. This threat is a driving force for a procedurally 
based system. Estlund, supra note 40, at 70. However, as long as individuals have easy 
rights of escape between governments, disagreements with the definition of correct stan-
dards can be solved through political realignment. 
 56.  A legal system where individuals can choose to follow the law sometimes but not 
others is not a system of law and order at all. There is no difference between this condition 
and individuals acting of their own accord without government in the state of nature. 
 57. See LOCKE, supra note 6. See generally HOBBES, supra note 5. 
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dural assurances of substantive justice.58 The foundation for this 
methodology was first proposed by George Smith59 and later devel-
oped by Randy Barnett.60 The methodology establishes the justness of 
a legal system by determining whether the system maintains proce-
dural methods which provide assurances that the resulting laws will 
protect justice.61 The logic of the methodology is that a given level of 
protection provides for a corresponding level of certainty that any 
given law is just. Therefore, the level of protection these procedural 
methods provide prescribes the corresponding legitimacy of the legal 
system and, consequently, the level of moral duty to obey the law.62 
This methodology allows for a legal system which is both legitimate 
and efficient in establishing a centralized legal system that effectu-
ates individuals being brought out of the state of nature.63 
 This method of analyzing the level of justness—and hence the 
level of moral duty that exists in any of its citizens to obey the law—
provides a method by which to evaluate the legitimacy of the juris-
prudential system of the Chicago school of law and economics and 
the Austrian school of law and economics. 
                                                                                                                     
 58. This could be considered a system of imperfect procedural justice with an inde-
pendent standard of justice. See RAWLS, supra note 35, at 85-86. 
 59. See George H. Smith, Justice Entrepreneurship in a Free Market, 3 J. 
LIBERTARIAN STUD. 405 (1979) [hereinafter Smith, Free Market]. George Smith proposed a 
legal system that was legitimate on libertarian grounds but was not totally voluntary. His 
system was based upon a truly public finding of fact and a verification of guilt which 
placed all burdens on the state and allowed no agression on the defendant until guilt was 
determined. Id. at 421-24; George H. Smith, Justice Entrepreneurship Revisited: A Re-
ply to Critics, 3 J. LIBERTARIAN STUD. 453, 456-58, 465-66 (1979) [hereinafter Smith, 
Reply to Critics]. 
 60. BARNETT, supra note 2 (applying this methodology to the U.S. Constitution); see 
also Randy E. Barnett, Libertarianism and Legitimacy: A Reply to Huebert, 19 J. 
LIBERTARIAN STUD. 71 (2005) (stating that he derived this methodology from Smith). 
George Smith has said that this methodology has roots in Robert Nozick’s recognition of 
legitimate procedural rules even in an “ultraminimal state.” See Smith, Free Market, supra 
note 59, at 406-07. There are also notable similarities between the theory of procedural as-
surances and Lon Fuller’s theory of justice, which relies upon a set of procedures necessary 
to make a legitimate law. See generally LON FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 33-94 (1964) 
(Fuller’s system is often considered one of pure procedural justice, but strong arguments 
are made that the procedures required are tools to achieve substative justice.). 
 61. See Arneson, supra note 40. Arneson is discussing the merits of democracy, but 
has the same fundamental proposition as Barnett—that without consent the legitimacy of 
a political procedure rests on that procedure’s ability to protect individual rights. There is 
no intrinsic merit in the procedure, only in the substantive outcome. “According to this 
[best results] approach, the procedures that work to produce the fairest outcomes are by 
definition the fairest procedures, so no trade-offs between fair procedures and fair out-
comes enters into the picture.” Id. at 10. 
 62. BARNETT, supra note 2, at 48, 51. 
 63. The methodology does not have the pitfalls of impossibility which actual consent 
does in large geographically based governments and does not fail to establish an entire le-
gal system, as the à la carte method does.  
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III.   THE SYSTEM OF JUSTNESS: PROTECTION OF LOCKEAN NATURAL 
RIGHTS 
 The methodology of establishing a moral duty to obey the law dis-
cussed in this Article relies upon a specific definition of justice. This 
Article will define justice as the protection of Lockean natural 
rights.64  However, in the general application of this methodology, 
any definition of justice can be used.65 
 Lockean natural rights are founded upon a belief that “every man 
has a Property in his own Person.”66 More precisely, each individual 
begins with absolute ownership of himself. As such, every man has 
complete and absolute dominion over his own body. It is important to 
conceptualize that a man’s body is both his flesh and his mind.67 
 Two derivative rights flow from man’s absolute right over his own 
person: the right to think and make decisions and the right to prop-
erty created with his own labor. The right to make decisions with 
one’s own mind necessarily requires that there is a freedom of auton-
omy in those decisions.68 Anything less than full autonomy in making 
one’s own decisions is an infringement upon his natural right to 
make those decisions. Taking away this autonomy would be, in ef-
                                                                                                                     
 64. See generally supra notes 4-5. More specifically, justice is the protection of all of 
one’s natural rights. The logic of this Article is that Lockean natural rights are the only 
natural rights one posesses. The term “Lockean natural rights” encompases a set of rights 
that is further described below. It is not, however, a rote acceptance of the rights John 
Locke arrived at. Classical liberal scholars have further developed Locke’s logic and their 
body of work is followed here. For example, see infra note 159. 
 65. See BARNETT, supra note 2, at 3-4.  
 66. LOCKE, supra note 6, at 28. Locke’s principle of a right to one’s own body is 
founded on religious grounds. Secular foundations to the right to one’s own body can be 
found in the philosophies of Immanuel Kane and Ayn Rand. For Immanuel Kant’s philoso-
phy, see IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDING OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS (Mary Gregor ed., 
Cambridge Univ. Press 1998) (1785) (human rationality and ability to reaons are the origi-
nation of natural rights, which necessitate free will); for Ayn Rand’s philosophy, see AYN 
RAND, THE NEW INTELLECTUAL 182 (1961) (“The source of man’s rights is not divine law or 
congressional law, but the law of identity. A is A—and man is man. Rights are conditions 
of existence required by man’s nature for his proper survival. If man is to live on earth, it 
is right for him to use his mind, it is right to act on his own free judgment, it is right to 
work for value and to keep the product of his work. If life on earth is his purpose, he has a 
right to live as a rational being: nature forbids him the irrational.”); Leonard Peikoff, Ob-
jectivism: The Philosophy of Ayn Rand, 353-54 (1991) (“Man’s rights require proof through 
the appropriate process of reduction. . . . Each of man’s rights has a specific source in the 
objectivist view of metaphysical nature . . . . All rights rest on the fact that man survives 
by a means of reason . . . that man is a productive being . . . the ethics of egoism.”). 
 67. See CHARLES FRIED, MODERN LIBERTY 95-107 (2007). 
 68. “[To] take this decision from you makes them a part-owner of you; it gives them a 
property right in you. Just as having such partial control and power of decision, by right, 
over an animal or inanimate object would be to have a property right in it.” NOZICK, supra 
note 20, at 173; see also CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE 7-8, 16 (1981) (describing 
the fundamental liberal doctrine that one has complete autonomy over his own mind). 
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fect, paternalism,69 and paternalism is the ultimate antithesis of 
self-ownership.70 
 As when one makes a decision with his mind and he owns it, and 
when he crafts an idea he owns it, when one’s hands mold clay he 
owns the resulting sculpture. One’s absolute property right over his 
own body creates additional property rights in goods when his labor is 
combined with materials which are otherwise not owned by another.71  
                                                                                                                     
 69. See Alan Schwarz, A Reexamination of Nonsubstantive Unconscionability, 63 VA. 
L. REV. 1053, 1061-62 (1977) (concluding that the application of unconscionability doc-
trines on nonsubstantive grounds for buyer incompetence, form contracts, or poverty actu-
ally harms these consumers. Such laws only benefit lawmakers who believe that the poor 
are then forced to make what are in the lawmakers’ beliefs “wise” decisions.). Even those 
who support the doctrine of unconscionability accept it as a paternalistic doctrine. See 
Duncan Kennedy, Distributive and Paternalist Motives in Contract and Tort Law, with 
Special Reference to Compulsory Terms and Unequal Bargaining Power, 41 MD. L. REV. 
563, 624-49 (1982); Anthony T. Kronman, Paternalism and the Law of Contracts, 92 YALE 
L.J. 763, 764 (1983). But see Seana Valentin Shiffrin, Paternalism, Unconscionability Doc-
trine, and Accommodation, 29 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 205, 221-24 (2000) (arguing that the un-
conscionability doctrine is not inherently paternalistic because the state is merely refusing 
to use force to effectuate the contract). For a rebuttal to Professor Shiffrin’s proposition, 
see infra note 74. Shiffrin agrees that truly paternalistic acts do intrude upon individuals’ 
sacred autonomy, but yet leaves some room for such policies. Shiffrin, supra, at 220 n.25. 
 70. See Gerald Dworkin, Paternalism, in MORALITY AND THE LAW (Richard A. Wasser-
strom ed., 1971); MILL, supra note 20, at 95. “Neither one person, nor any number of per-
sons, is warranted in saying to another human creature of ripe years, that he shall not do 
with his life for his own benefit what he chooses to do with it.” Id. Even the limited scope 
for paternalism to prevent an individual from making incorrect, irrational, and/or future 
liberty restricting choices has been criticized by some writing for the philosophy of liber-
tarianism, see e.g., Gregory Mitchell, Libertarian Paternalism Is an Oxymoron, 99 NW. U. 
L. REV. 1245, 1260-69 (2005), on the grounds that such policies still violate one’s natural 
right to autonomy of the self. See FRIED, supra note 67, at 46-50. “[A]s human beings we do 
not just experience good and evil but reflect upon and choose them, that goods not chosen 
are hardly human at all . . . . It follows that when we are deprived of our power of choice, 
we are not just infantilized, we are dehumanized, whatever good things are returned to us 
in exchange.” Id. at 50. In other words, the value of our actions is that we choose them. If 
we do not make that choice, the value of that result is undermined. The implication of this 
is that preempting one’s choices prevents that individual from making decisions of value. 
However, unfortunately paternalism is found throughout our law. See Eyal Zamir, The Ef-
ficiency of Paternalism, 84 VA. L. REV. 229, 230 (1998). 
 71. Locke terms materials which no one has a property interest in as being in the 
state of nature. This is Locke’s famed Labor theory of property. “Whatsoever then he re-
moves out of the state that nature hath provided, and left it in, he hath mixed his labor 
with, and joined to it something that is his own, and thereby makes it his property.” 
LOCKE, supra note 6, at § 27. For simplicity’s sake we will not include the right of first ap-
propriation as a Lockean Natural right. Some classically liberal scholars consider the right 
of first appropriation (also referred to as homesteading) one and the same as Locke’s labor 
theory, but they are technically distinct. See Peter Benson, Philosophy of Property Law, in 
THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF LAW, supra note 18, at 
752, 762-63 & n.16 (illustrating the distinction through the interpretation of the historic 
case Pierson v. Post, 3 CAI. 175 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805)); Richard A. Epstein, Possession as the 
Root of Title, 13 GA. L. REV. 1221, 1224-30, 1238-43 (1979). Of significant note, Locke’s 
theory contains a proviso that purports to limit the ablity to acquire property. This theory 
has been strongly rebutted by classical liberal scholars. See infra note 159. 
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 So, an individual naturally has absolute property rights in three 
things: his body, the autonomous decisions and ideas that are pro-
duced by his mind, and the goods which are produced by a combina-
tion of his labor and nonappropriated materials.72 
 From these three natural rights flow two necessary conditions: the 
freedom to contract and the freedom from contract.73 Freedom to con-
tract holds that an individual may freely and voluntarily enter into a 
contract, that a contract shall not be held void, and that a contract 
shall be enforced.74 Voluntariness includes all deliberate75 actions 
                                                                                                                     
 72. This is also commonly known as Locke’s trilogy of Life, Liberty, and Property. 
 73. See BARNETT, STRUCTURE OF LIBERTY, supra note 20, at 65-68; Richard E. Speidel, 
The New Spirit of Contract, 2 J.L. & COM. 193, 194-99 (1982); see also JOHN STEWART 
MILL, PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 290 (Donald Winch ed., 1970) (1848). Though 
Mill was a utilitarian and did not base his philosophy on natural rights, his philosophical 
work is a foundation of classical liberalism and is appropriate to shed light on the neces-
sary deduction of freedom of contract from one’s property right in himself. 
 74. The idea that the state may enforce contracts on an unwilling party can appear on 
its face to be a limit on individual liberty. See Mark Pettit, Jr., Freedom, Freedom of Con-
tract, and the “Rise and Fall,” 79 B.U. L. REV. 263, 287-90 (1999); Shiffrin, supra note 69, 
at 221-24. However, allowing oneself the ability to bind his future self is allowing for his 
autonomy by enlarging the realm of voluntary agreement. To not allow a man to bind his 
future self would take away his self-determination. See FRIED, supra note 68, at 16, 20-21. 
Also, once one voluntarily consents, he has done so through the free exercise of his mind 
and is therefore morally bound to the consequences. Id. Peter Benson, Abstract Right and 
the Possibility of a Nondistributive Conception of Contract: Hegel and Contemporary Con-
tract Thoery, 10 CARDOZO L. REV. 1077, 1177-96 (1989). Arguably more important than the 
promisor being morally bound to honor his contractual promise, when the act of contract is 
a manifestation of promissor’s consent a right against the promissor has been acquired by 
the promisee. Barnett, Consent Theory, supra note 45, at 296-300. As it is just for the gov-
ernment to enforce all rights, it is just for the government to enforce this right. Fried’s the-
ory is commonly interpreted as a being based upon good behavior. In short, the state must 
enforce contracts because it is good behavior to honor one’s promise. A strong objection to 
this, though, is that it is not legitimate for the government to enforce behavior which is 
simply good. In contrast, Barnett’s theory is based upon consent which leads to rights. It is 
certainly legitimate for the government to enforce rights. The difference between Fried’s 
and Barnett’s theories parallels the difference between a jurisprudence based upon natural 
law and one based upon natural right or moral right and legal right. See Barnett, Law Pro-
fessor’s Guide, supra note 45, at 666-78). See generally JEREMY WALDRON, LAW AND 
DISAGREEMENT 214-19 (2004)).  Therefore, forcing compliance with a contract voluntarily 
entered into is not counter to individual liberty. See AYN RAND, Man’s Rights, in THE 
VIRTUE OF SELFISHNESS 149-50 (1964).  Also, the application of not enforcing contracts 
most likely reduces the aggregate level of individual liberty. FRIED, supra note 68, at 8; 
Todd D. Rakoff, Is “Freedom from Contract” Necessarily a Libertarian Freedom?, WIS. L. 
REV. 477, 491-92 (2004). The following statement by Sir George Jessel is a well-recognized 
pronouncement that freedom to contract is composed of three elements: contracts are en-
tered into voluntarily, contracts shall not be held void, and contracts shall be enforced.  
It must not be forgotten that you are not to extend arbitrarily those rules 
which say that a given contract is void as being against public policy, because if 
there is one thing which more than any another public policy requires it is that 
men of full age and competent understanding shall have the utmost liberty of 
contracting, and that their contracts when entered into freely and voluntarily 
shall be held sacred and shall be enforced by Courts of justice. Therefore, you 
have this paramount public policy to consider—that you are not lightly to inter-
fere with this freedom of contract.  
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which are done without fraud or duress.76 Freedom from contract 
holds that an individual may refrain from transferring his property 
rights.77 While in theory a legal system could exist where one of these 
freedoms would exist without the other,78 logic dictates that abrogat-
ing either the freedom to or the freedom from contract is an in-
fringement upon the individual’s natural right to his own property.79 
 The conditions upon which the following jurisprudential systems 
will be evaluated to determine whether they protect Lockean natural 
rights are the right to one’s own body, the right to the autonomy of 
decision, and the right to the property which one produces, along 
with the necessary derivatives of freedom to contract those rights 
and the freedom from contracting those rights. 
IV.   EVALUATING THE CHICAGO AND AUSTRIAN LAW AND ECONOMICS 
JURISPRUDENTIAL SYSTEMS THROUGH BARNETT’S METHODOLOGY 
 A jurisprudence of law and economics proposes that judges deter-
mine cases based upon the most economically efficient outcomes.80 In 
this way, law and economics is a procedural methodology of jurispru-
dence.81 This methodology has multiple schools, but this Article will 
examine only the Chicago and Austrian schools. This study will sur-
vey the outcomes of legal controversies under these two schools in 
order to determine whether, as jurisprudential procedures, they pro-
tect Lockean natural rights and the requisite freedoms discussed 
                                                                                                                     
Id. at 479-80 (quoting Printing & Numerical Registering Co. v. Sampson, (1875) 19 L.R. 
Eq. 462, 465).  
         What Sir Jessel terms freedom of contract, Rakoff terms freedom to contract in order 
to accommodate the slightly distinct concept of freedom from contract. See id. at 481, 488. 
 75. “Deliberate” refers to the deliberateness of the act committed by the individual, 
not the consequential action or the resulting end.  
 76. Rakoff, supra note 74, at 480. 
 77. Id. at 481; BARNETT, STRUCTURE OF LIBERTY, supra note 20, at 65. The term 
“freedom from contract” is sometimes expanded to include the lack of legal enforcement of 
a voluntary agreement. See Edwin Patterson, An Apology for Consideration, 58 COLUM. L. 
REV. 929, 949-52 (1958). However, for the reasons explained in note 51, this Article’s use of 
the term “freedom from contract” does not include Patterson’s lack of enforcing contracts. 
 78. Modern legal systems often respect the freedom to contract more than they do the 
freedom from contract. 
 79. Robert Nozick’s entitlement theory of justice, which holds that justly held prop-
erty rights must be either justly originally acquired or justly transferred, mandates that 
transfer must be both free (freedom to contract) and voluntary (freedom from contract). 
NOZICK, supra note 20, at 159-64. See generally Honore, supra note 37, at 156-57 (explain-
ing how freedom from contract, which he terms freedom not to contract, is a necessary 
principle for the philosophical foundations of contract). 
 80. NICHOLAS MERCURO & STEVEN G. MEDEMA, ECONOMICS AND THE LAW: FROM 
POSNER TO POST MODERNISM AND BEYOND 105-07 (2d ed. 2006). See generally LOUIS 
KALPOW & STEVEN SHAVELL, FAIRNESS VERSUS WELFARE 52-58 (2002); RICHARD POSNER, 
PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 353-61 (2005).  
 81.  As a jurisprudence which resolves controversies according to a written (or unwrit-
ten) law is a procedure, so is a jurisprudence which resolves controversies according to eco-
nomic efficiency.   
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above. So far as these schools’ policies protect Lockean natural 
rights, a jurisprudence based upon them would also protect those 
rights. Each system would then serve as a procedural safeguard for 
Lockean natural rights. As such, to the degree that each jurispruden-
tial system protects Lockean natural rights, they are legitimate and 
are owed a moral duty of obedience by individuals.82 
A.   Introduction to the Chicago and Austrian Schools 
 The Chicago school is based upon modern neoclassical economics 
and the Austrian school is based upon Austrian economics.83 Both the 
modern neo-classical and the Austrian schools of economics are de-
rived from the marginalist revolution of the mid-1800s.84 The mar-
ginalist revolution featured a number of insights, but most relevant 
to the understanding of the Chicago and Austrian schools is the 
movement’s ability to derive economic laws from the observation of 
individuals making their own subjectively-based choices.85 Econo-
mists from the marginalist revolution concluded that individual ac-
tors made decisions to buy, sell, or refrain from acting based upon 
their own subjectively valued incentives and costs in order to ad-
vance their own ends.86 Furthermore, these actions resulted in the 
creation of objectively wealthier markets.87 
 The modern neoclassical school grew to embody the assumptions 
that individuals exhibit maximizing behavior, that individuals ex-
hibit stable preferences, and that markets are close to and strive to 
reach equilibrium.88 The assumption that individuals exhibit maxi-
mizing behavior includes the proposition that both buyers and sellers 
                                                                                                                     
 82. See supra Part II.B.3. 
 83. For a neoclassical economics introdution, see JOHN M. LEVY, ESSENTIAL 
MICROECONOMICS FOR PUBLIC POLICY ANALYSIS 61-64 (1995). 
 84. The marginalist revolution in economics is attributed primarily to the works of 
Stanley Jevons, Léon Walras, and Carl Menger. Of the three, the works of Menger were 
the most influential on the Austrian school. A.M. ENDRES, NEOCLASSICAL MICROECONOMIC 
THEORY: THE FOUNDING AUSTRIAN VERSION 1-8, 19-23 (1997). See id. at 210-21 for a more 
direct discussion of the similar origins of modern neoclassical and Austrian schools and 
where they went their separate ways. See ALLEN OAKLEY, THE FOUNDATIONS OF AUSTRIAN 
ECONOMICS FROM MENGER TO MISES 54-61 (1997) (discussing the subjectivist foundation of 
Menger’s marginalist scholarship). This subjectivism, the reader will see, is at the founda-
tion of Austrian economics. 
 85. Joseph J. Spengler, The Marginal Revolution and Concern with Economic Growth, in 
THE MARGINAL REVOLUTION IN ECONOMICS 203, 212 (R.D. Collison Black et al. eds. 1973). 
 86. Id. 
 87. See William Jaffe, Léon Walras’ Role in the “Marginal Revolution” of the 1870s, in 
THE MARGINAL REVOLUTION IN ECONOMICS, supra note 85, at 113, 118-21; Donald Winch, 
Marginalism and the Boundaries of Economic Science, in THE MARGINAL REVOLUTION IN 
ECONOMICS, supra note 85, at 59, 62-63. Menger’s work, however, doubted the ability to 
verify objectively wealthier markets. Id. at 64. 
 88. GARY S. BECKER, THE ECONOMIC APPROACH TO HUMAN BEHAVIOR 5 (1976). 
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are fully rational and have high levels of information.89 The assump-
tion that the market is in equilibrium includes the proposition that 
there is no price taking—which necessitates perfect competition and 
a lack of monopolies—and that those products are standardized. The 
modern neoclassical school also assumes that all goods are assigned 
property rights and those property rights are enforced. It is not ex-
plicitly stated that property rights can be valued objectively, but the 
school’s methodology necessarily does so through its use of utility 
functions, its utilization of interpersonal comparisons of value, and 
its overlooking of the inherent subjective nature of individual deci-
sionmaking.90 Through these assumptions, the neoclassical school’s 
analysis is based upon system-wide models.91 
 While the Chicago school’s model attempts to reflect the system, 
the Austrian school’s92 model attempts to reflect individual actions.93 
In doing so, the Austrian school’s critique of the Chicago model is 
that by trivializing the very real, inherently subjective nature of in-
dividual decision-making, its results are a distortion of reality.94 The 
Austrian school asserts that due to the Chicago school’s demand for 
determinacy, its model crowds out very significant questions of sub-
jective assessment, institutional context, social embeddedness, 
knowledge, judgment, entrepreneurship, creativity, process, and his-
tory.95 The Austrian school is not alone in making this criticism.96 
                                                                                                                     
 89. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 3 (5th ed. 1998). The microeco-
nomic foundations of modern neoclassical economics are predicated on full information, but 
more advanced applications of the methodology do include some considerations of informa-
tion levels. To illustrate this through contrast, see infra note 155 and accompanying text. 
 90. See Steven Horwitz, Subjectivism, in THE ELGAR COMPANION TO AUSTRIAN 
ECONOMICS 17, 17, 20-21 (Peter J. Boettke ed., 1994); Walter Block, Austrian Theorizing: 
Recalling the Foundations, Q.J. AUSTRIAN ECON., Winter 1999, at 21, 31, available at 
http://www.mises.org/journals/qjae/pdf/qjae2_4_2.pdf. See generally Israel M. Kirzner, The 
Subjectivism of Austrian Economics, in THE DRIVING FORCE OF THE MARKET: ESSAYS IN 
AUSTRIAN ECONOMICS 41, 43-45 (2000). (Note: these sources are all Austrian critiques of 
the Chicago school.)  
 91. Id. 
 92. This Article dedicates significantly more space to describing and distinguishing 
the Austrian school from the Chicago school than it does in describing the Chicago school 
only because the Austrian school is widely misunderstood while the Chicago school is very 
mainstream. This level of attention is not in any way intended to argue for the correctness 
of the Austrian school’s position over that of the Chicago School. 
 93. Gregory B. Christiansen, Methodological Individualism, in THE ELGAR 
COMPANION TO AUSTRIAN ECONOMICS, supra note 90, at 11 (The neoclassical school also 
begins its analysis with methodological individualism, but ends up extrapolating future ac-
tions from past actions and making assumptions that actors will make future choices based 
upon these models.). 
 94. See supra note 90. 
 95. Id.; supra note 142.  
 96. See Warren J. Samuels, Determinate Solutions and Valuational Process: Overcom-
ing the Foreclosure of Process, 11 J. POST KEYNESIAN ECON. 531, 538-41 (1989); see also Pe-
ter J. Boettke, What Is Wrong with Neoclassical Economics (and What Is Still Wrong with 
Austrian Economics)?, in BEYOND NEOCLASSICAL ECONOMICS: HETERODOX APPROACHES TO 
ECONOMIC THEORY 22, 29 (Fred E. Foldvary ed., 1996). 
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The Keynesians and other heterodox schools make the same criticism 
of the Chicago school. However, unlike these heterodox schools which 
attempt to utilize some form of aggregate analysis to resolve ques-
tions, the Austrian School extends the traditional neoclassical prin-
ciples of microeconomics which they share with the modern neoclas-
sical school—namely, individuals advancing their own ends through 
meaningful, subjectively based choices and market interactions 
which increase their utility—in order to account for the subjective 
nature of individual decisionmaking.97 
 There are two main projects within the Austrian school. Both are 
generally characterized by the above description, but the two have 
significantly different methodologies.98 The first is primarily repre-
sented by Frederick H. Hayek.99 Hayek’s project does not fundamen-
tally disagree with the Chicago neoclassical model but, rather, con-
cludes that the assumptions discussed above are too expansive.100 To 
this effect, the project attempts to reform the Chicago school’s per-
spective and models.101 In many respects this project does not dis-
agree with the equilibrium analysis of the Chicago school, but con-
cludes that the vast majority of economic growth results from entre-
preneurial developments advancing production possibility rather 
than from static markets reaching equilibruim. The other Austrian 
school project is primarily represented by Ludwig von Mises and 
Murray Rothbard.102 The Mises-Rothbard project has fundamental 
differences from the modern neoclassical model the Chicago school 
relies upon.103 This project rejects the neoclassical economic theory 
use of consumer indifference in utility functions, the use of cardinal-
ity in utility functions, the continuity of utility functions, and the 
neoclassical theory of uncertainty and probability.104 Understanding 
these differences between Chicago’s neoclassical and Austrian eco-
nomics will facilitate understanding why the schools reach different 
policy positions.  
 The neoclassical utility function incorporates a theory of consumer 
indifference, necessarily assuming that it is possible for economists 
                                                                                                                     
 97. See Murray N. Rothbard, Praxeology: The Methodology of Austrian Economics, in 
THE FOUNDATIONS OF MODERN AUSTRIAN ECONOMICS 28, 30-31 (Edwin G. Dolan ed., 
1976); supra notes 80-83 and accompanying text.  
 98. Bryan Caplan, The Austrian Search for Realistic Foundations, S. ECON. J. 65(4), 
Apr. 1999, at 823, 823-24; Block, supra note 90, at 21. 
 99. See sources cited supra note 98. 
 100. See sources cited supra note 98. 
 101. See sources cited supra note 98. Hayek’s alterations of the neoclassical model fo-
cused mostly on information economics, theory of the firm, entrepreneurship, and mone-
tary economics. See generally F.A. VON HAYEK, THE ESSENCE OF HAYEK 3042, 131-59, 211-
80 (Chiaki Nishiyama & Kurt R. Leube eds., 1984). 
 102. See sources cited supra note 98.  
 103. See sources cited supra note 98.  
 104. E.g., Block, supra note 90, at 22-29. 
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to determine economic actors’ motives and information without the 
real action of each actor.105 The Mises-Rothbard project’s rejection of 
this theory is founded on the premise that only through an actor’s 
real act of selection can his preference be deduced.106 This is because 
only the subjective individual actor knows his own introspective 
characteristics. Consequently, it is impossible to determine the ac-
tor’s value or preference without his real action.107 The implication of 
this is an undermining of the utility curve from which economists 
predict individual actor’s choices.108 
 The neoclassical utility function operates primarily on ordinal 
valuation but necessarily, to a degree, also on cardinal valuations.109 
A cardinal valuation is a quantification of preference and is used in 
empirical valuations to create a utility function, while an ordinal 
valuation is simply a preference of option A over option B.110 Under 
the neoclassical model, cardinality is used to determine how an indi-
vidual acts to maximize his utility,111 while under the Mises-
Rothbard project’s model only ordinal preferences are used to deter-
mine how an individual acts to satisfy the highest-ranked feasible 
preference on the individual’s value scale.112 The Mises-Rothbard pro-
ject’s complete rejection of the use of cardinal valuations is premised 
on the concept that an economist is unable to deduce an actor’s in-
tensity of preference through the actor’s selection of good A or good 
B. For example, while the actor selects the second apple over the first 
orange, see note 122, this tells us nothing about how much more the 
actor values the second apple over the first orange. The Mises-
Rothbard project’s rejection of cardinal valuation is also based upon 
there being a lack of a means to empirically quantify intrinsic happi-
                                                                                                                     
 105. See LEVY, supra note 83, at 61-64.  
 106. Mises stated, “The scale of value manifests itself only in real acting; it can be dis-
cerned only from the observation of real acting.” LUDWIG VON MISES, HUMAN ACTION: A 
TREATISE ON ECONOMICS 102 (Scholar’s ed., The Ludwig von Mises Inst. 1998) (1966), 
available at http://www.mises.org/humanaction/pdf/HumanActionScholars.pdf. 
 Rothbard stated, “The crucial fallacy is that “indifference” cannot be a basis for action. If 
a man were really indifferent between two alternatives, he could not make any choice be-
tween them, and therefore the choice could not be revealed in action.” MURRAY N. 
ROTHBARD, MAN, ECONOMY, AND STATE: A TREATISE ON ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES (1962), re-
printed in MAN, ECONOMY, AND STATE WITH POWER AND MARKET 1, 307 (Ludwig Von Mises 
Inst. 2d ed. 2004) (1962), available at http://www.mises.org/rothbard/mespm.pdf.  
 107. Id. 
 108. Rothbard, supra note 97, at 21.  
 109. MERCURO & MEDEMA, supra note 80, at 103; Block, supra note 90, at 25-26. But 
see Caplan, supra note 98, at 827.  
 110. See id.  
 111. A cardinal valuation of apples and oranges would be represented by the equation 
)ln()1()ln( orangesquantityofaapplesquantityofautility ∗−±∗= . 
 112. An ordinal valuation of apples and oranges would be represented by {1st apple, 
2nd apple, 1st orange, 3rd apple . . . }.  
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ness or utility.113 The only thing that can be deduced is that the actor 
valued the second apple more than the first orange.114 The implica-
tions of this are that it undermines the Chicago school’s ability to 
compare utility to price ratios, such as 2211 PMUPMU ÷=÷ .115  
Utility functions are the method through which cost-benefit calculus 
is done, which is further used in the calculus of interpersonal com-
parisons of utility.116 Therefore, according to the Mises-Rothbard pro-
ject neither utility functions nor interpersonal comparisons of these 
calculations can be done. 
 The neoclassical utility function incorporates a theory of continu-
ity in the economic actor’s selection of alternatives.117 This theory al-
lows for smooth graphical lines, which allows for the creation of pre-
dictive graphs.118 The Mises-Rothbard project rejects this continuity 
theory on the premise that individuals are not able to make decisions 
based upon infinitesimally small distinctions.119 Consquently, a 
graphical representation of their behavior does not generate a per-
fectly smooth line.120 The consequence of the inability to chart precise 
points further undermines the economist’s ability to use a utility line in 
a graph.121 Furthermore, as the data are not continuous, the data points 
cannot even be used in a function equation to produce a curve.122  
                                                                                                                     
 113. Weight has pounds, height has inches, distance has miles, temperature has de-
grees Fahrenheight, but intrinsic happiness and utility have no valuation. 
 114. “Value scales of each individual are purely ordinal, and there is no way whatever 
of measuring the distance between the ranking; indeed, any concept of such distance is a 
fallacious one.” ROTHBARD, supra note 106, at 222. 
 115. “[While neoclassical economics holds] that in equilibrium the ratio of the marginal 
utilities of the various goods equals the ratio of their prices . . . we can see [that conclu-
sion’s] absurdity clearly, since utilities are not quantities and therefore cannot be divided.” 
Id. at 262. 
 116. See Figure 1. 
 117. Mercuro & Medema, supra note 80, at 103.  
 118. See LEVY, supra note 83.  
 119. [I]t must first of all be objected that the peculiarly mathematical conception 
of in-finitesimal quantities is inapplicable to economic problems. The utility af-
forded by a given amount of commodities . . . is either great enough for valua-
tion, or so small that it remains imperceptible to the valuer and therefore can-
not affect his judgment. 
LUDWIG VON MISES, THE THEORY OF MONEY AND CREDIT 44 (Yale Univ. Press 1953), avail-
able at http://www.mises.org/books/Theory_Money_Credit/Contents.aspx. 
 Rothbard stated, “[H]uman beings act on the basis of things that are relevant to their ac-
tion. The human being cannot see the infinitely small step; it therefore has no meaning to 
him and no relevance to his action.” ROTHBARD, supra note 106, at 306.  
 120. See and contrast Figures 2 & 3. See ROTHBARD, supra note 106, at 264. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Block, supra note 90, at 21, 26.  
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 The neoclassical theory of uncertainty and probability asserts that 
for any given situation, an economist can determine the known prob-
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ability distribution of the outcome.123 If this were the case, the popu-
lation would be a “class probability.” In order for there to be a class 
probability, all relevant facts must be known.124 The Mises-Rothbard 
project rejects class probability as a universal theory.125 Mises-
Rothbard theorists emphasize that an economist must distinguish 
between class probabilities and case probabilities.126 While the prob-
ability of outcomes for class probabilities can be predicted (for exam-
ple, the lottery), the Austrian School asserts that in real life the vast 
majority of actions are case probabilities for which the probability of 
any given outcome cannot be predicted.127 Case probabilities cannot 
be predicted by an economist because economists know nothing about 
the individual actor’s subjective preferences, knowledge, entrepre-
neurship, and so on.128 Rothbard asserts that one of the only accurate 
uses of case probability in economics is insurance.129 Furthermore, 
the Austrian school asserts that new ideas and scenarios are always 
emerging and serve to alter or replace models based upon past 
events.130 Because of these complications, models based upon current 
or past information cannot be used to predict the probability of any 
future outcome.131 
 These distinct characteristics of the Austrian school methodology 
result in the school’s adherence to assumptions that are different 
than the Chicago school’s. The Austrian school holds the following 
assumptions. First, buyers and sellers are not fully informed nor 
fully rational. Second, their levels of information and rationality are 
not static. Through realizing the consequence of their own mistakes 
                                                                                                                     
 123. See MARK SEINDENFELD, MICROECONMIC PREDICATES TO LAW AND ECONOMICS, 
5-19 (1996).  
 124. The quintessential example of a class probability is the lottery.  
 125. Block, supra note 90, at 31. 
[The use of class probability] is the crux of the failure of neoclassical economics 
to make good on its exultant promise to predict the future. As long as there is 
free will, as long as people are “free to choose,” prognostication is a chimera. 
Even if their past acts could be accurately characterized by a normal distribu-
tion, or according with some specific elasticity or another, this does not at all 
warrant the assumption that they will continue to do so in the future. 
Id. Of note, Block’s use of the phrase “free to choose” is in reference to the Nobel Prize-
winning neoclassical economics book, Milton Friedman’s Free to Choose (2d ed. 1987), a 
title which seems to Block a great irony for a methodology which purports to predict in-
dividuals’ choices.  
 126. Id.  
 127. Id. 
 128. Mises stated, “[F]or economists to use class probability, we must know everything 
about the behavior of a whole class of events or phenomena; but about the actual singular 
events or phenomena we know nothing but that they are elements of this class.” MISES, 
supra note 106, at 107; Block, supra note 90, at 21, 31. 
 129. ROTHBARD, supra note 106, at 552-55. 
 130. MISES, supra note 106, at 177-91 (this is a fundamental principle of the Austrian 
school and is shared by both Austrian projects). 
 131. See supra notes 105-08, 119-22, 125-28 and accompanying text. 
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and observing the consequences of others’ mistakes, individuals will 
be motivated to gather more information and become more rational 
actors.132 Third, more efficient actors are encouraged to make them-
selves more prevalent in the market while less efficient actors are 
encouraged to limit their involvement. Fourth, entrepreneurship133 is 
a significant variable in efficient operations; individuals possess 
varying levels of entrepreneurship, and good entrepreneurship can 
be increased through incentives. Fifth, products are not necessarily 
standardized. Sixth, all goods are assigned property rights and those 
property rights are enforced.134 Seventh, property rights can only be 
valued subjectively,135 so it is both impossible and incorrect to evalu-
ate property rights objectively.136  
 While the Austrian school does not assume that information is 
complete, that individual actors are completely rational, or that indi-
vidual actors are ideal entrepreneurs, the school recognizes that in-
creasing these variables is vital to increasing efficiency.137 To that 
end, the school seeks policies that reward acquiring knowledge, proc-
essing knowledge with rationality, and acting with good entrepre-
                                                                                                                     
 132. ISRAEL M. KIRZNER, PERCEPTION, OPPORTUNITY AND PROFIT STUDIES IN THE 
THEORY OF ENTREPRENEURSHIP 121-33, 135-36 (1979). The term “rational” is used here, 
but within the context of Austrian economics the term “error” is more appropriate. This is 
because it is a fundamental principle of the school that all individuals act for rational 
purpose, though they may err in being alert for information, err in learning how to proc-
ess and apply that information, or not even be capable of making the proper decision. 
Id.; LUDWIG VON MISES, THEORY AND HISTORY: AN INTERPRETATION OF SOCIAL AND 
ECONOMIC EVOLUTION 268 (The Mises Inst. 1985) (1957), available at 
http://www.mises.org/th/theoryhistory.pdf. 
 133. Entrepreneurship is, fundamentally, a function of one’s ability to perceive and 
forecast the future. See Murray N. Rothbard, Professor Hérbert on Entrepreneurship, 7 J. 
LIBERTARIAN STUD. 281, 287 (1985). A business owner’s level of entrepreneurship is his 
ability to predict and act upon future prices of goods and labor; his ability to perceive an 
unmet demand in the ever-dynamic market, develop a product to fill that niche, and de-
liver that product to the consumers; and his ability to combine the assets of multiple ac-
tors. See id. at 281-82. The common element here is alertness to opportunity. Israel M. 
Kirzner, Equilibrium vs. Market Process, in THE FOUNDATIONS OF MODERN AUSTRIAN 
ECONOMICS 115, 120 (Edwin G. Dolan ed., 1976). While Israel Kirzner’s version of entre-
preneurship is based on being alert to new opportunities to increase a market’s efficiency, 
another approach within the Austrian school is Joseph Schumpeter’s entrepreneurship, 
which is based on a leader breaking away from the routine and destroying existing ineffi-
cient structures. Id. at 235-54. 
 134. See Walter Block, Private Property Rights, Economic Freedom, and Professor 
Coase: A Critique of Friedman, McCloskey, Medema, and Zorn, 26 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 
923, 923-24 (2003). 
 135. Hayek called the economic planners’ concept that utility can be objectively meas-
ured their “fatal conceit.” F.A. HAYEK, THE FATAL CONCEIT: THE ERRORS OF SOCIALISM 
(W.W. Bartley, III ed., 1989). 
 136. Joseph Becker, Comment, Procrustean Jurisprudence: An Austrian School Eco-
nomic Critique of the Separation and Regulation of Liberties in the Twentieth Century 
United States, 15 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 671, 691, 693-94 (1995). 
 137. KIRZNER, supra note 132, at 121-33, 135-36; Sanford Ikeda, Market Process, in 
THE ELGAR COMPANION TO AUSTRIAN ECONOMICS, supra note 90, at 23, 23-24. 
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neurship.138 Likewise, the school seeks policies that deter the failure 
to acquire knowledge, the failure to rationally process knowledge, 
and the failure to act with good entrepreneurship.139 
 The Austrian school of law and economics also stresses that mar-
kets are always a better source of information than individual ac-
tors.140 The effectiveness of markets is the function of the vast num-
ber of actors who combine their information, rationality, and motiva-
tion for accuracy to create the market’s demand, quantity, and 
price.141 The Austrian school takes this theory to its logical conclusion 
in holding that a judge or administrative agency clerk, being only a 
single actor, can never accurately substitute his knowledge for the 
market’s knowledge by determining an alternative price.142 
 These comparisons exhibit the central underlying methodological 
differences between the two schools. The Chicago school believes that 
generalized models of the system can be used to model economies and 
within that economy individual actors’ decisions can be predicted on 
this stochastic model. The Austrian school operates on the under-
                                                                                                                     
 138. See id. 
 139. See id. 
 140. The most classic example of this is Mises’ theory regarding money, which holds 
that goods can only be accurately valued by a market. Murray Rothbard, The Austrian 
Theory of Money, in THE FOUNDATIONS OF MODERN AUSTRIAN ECONOMICS, supra note 97, 
at 161, 161-62. As such, a central planning authority could never accurately label the true 
value of a good. See MISES, supra note 106, at 395-97; MISES, supra note 119, at 29-194. 
This axiom played out in the skewed product valuations of the USSR. THOMAS SOWELL, 
BASIC ECONOMICS: A CITIZEN’S GUIDE TO THE ECONOMY 9-12 (2004). The Chicago school 
would not disagree with this analysis of the value of money and this reason for the Soviet 
Union’s demise. 
 141. Id. 
 142. MERCURO & MEDEMA, supra note 80, at 301; see F.A. Hayek, The Use of Knowl-
edge in Society, in THE ESSENCE OF HAYEK 211, 212-15 (1984); F.A. HAYEK, LAW, 
LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY: VOLUME 1 94-123 (1973). Between these two sources, Hayek 
comes to this position for Burkian reasons (traditional practices carry with them a pre-
sumption of soundness due to the likelihood that many actors over many generations have 
correctly aggregated institutional knowledge), reasons of self interest (only the actor di-
rectly effected has the proper motive to acquire proper levels of information and process 
it accurately), subjectivist reasons (only the affected actor can accurately value the goods 
and services), and for reasons of consistency in the rule of law (consistency in the law al-
lows actors to efficiency structure their interactions). Todd J. Zywicki & Anthony B. 
Sanders, Posner, Hayek, and the Economic Analysis of Law 7-11, 19, 47 (George Mason 
Law & Economics Research Paper No. 07-05, 2007), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=957177; Walter Block, Coase and Demsetz on Private Property 
Rights, 1 J. LIBERTARIAN STUD. 111, 115 (1977); Block, supra note 134, at 930, 938; 
MURRAY N. ROTHBARD, Law, Property Rights, and Air Pollution, in THE LOGIC OF 
ACTION TWO: APPLICATIONS AND CRITICISMS FROM THE AUSTRIAN SCHOOL 121, 126-27 
(1997), available at http://www.mises.org/rothbard/lawproperty.pdf (Rothbard’s rejection of 
this possibility is due to his principle that, being only a single actor, a judge will not have 
enough information to value accurately, that valuations must be subjective, and that in-
terpersonal comparisons of utility are impossible). 
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standing that models must be specific to individual actors’ decisions 
and that these individual decisions cannot be predicted precisely.143 
A.   Freedom from Contract 
 Freedom from contract is the freedom to refrain from exchange.144 
According to a system of Lockean natural rights, an individual’s 
freedom of choice gives him complete autonomy in choosing whether 
to contract or to refrain from contracting.145 Forcing an individual to 
enter into a contract would result in an involuntary “agreement” and 
therefore would violate the individual’s natural rights.146 
 The Chicago school’s general principle regarding freedom from 
contract is that individuals will voluntarily enter into all contracts 
that are utility-maximizing.147 They will do so because they have high 
levels of information and are fully rational.148 Because this will hap-
pen, forcing individuals to enter into contracts that they would not 
voluntarily enter into would be forcing a transaction which is not 
Pareto-efficient.149 However, in theory at least, this leaves open the 
desirability that individuals who do not have full information or are 
not acting with full rationality should be forced into the efficient 
transactions which they overlooked.150  
 One of the Chicago school’s most central insights is that high 
transaction costs can prevent the reassignment of property rights to 
the most efficient holder.151 Proponents of the Chicago law and eco-
nomic field propose that when there are high transaction costs which 
                                                                                                                     
 143. Id. 
 144. BARNETT, STRUCTURE OF LIBERTY, supra note 20, at 65. The phrase “freedom from 
contract” has been given many meanings. Rakoff, supra note 74, at 477-88. Rakoff’s topic 
was the use of the phrase in the modern legal sense. That he examines five meanings of 
the term and discards only the one applied here shows the intuitive injustice of imposing a 
contract on an individual. 
 145. See supra note 79 and accompanying text. 
 146. If there were consent to the law, then one could consent to not be free from con-
tract. As established earlier, however, there is no consent to the law; so, in order to protect 
Lockean natural rights, the legal system must protect the freedom from contract. 
 147. Anthony T. Kronman & Richard A. Posner, Introduction: Economic Theory and 
Contract Law, in THE ECONOMICS OF CONTRACT LAW 1, 1-3 (Anthony T. Kronman & Rich-
ard A. Posner eds., 1979). 
 148. POSNER, supra note 89, at 3-12, 17-19. 
 149. Id. at 11. 
 150. But see id. at 15-16. While Posner states that the voluntariness of contracts is a 
good validation that they are utility increasing, he leaves open the possibility that there 
are conditions where an involuntary transaction could be more desirable. As is illustrated 
later, this is a core principle of the Coase theorem and is most clearly applied in the case of 
eminent domain and monopoly dissolution. There is, however, a distinction between forc-
ing a contract for Coasean reasons—high transaction costs—and forcing a contract because 
the individual has low levels of information or rationality. 
 151. R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. ECON. 1, 13 (1960). 
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are determined to prevent otherwise utility maximizing transactions, 
the court should take a role in reallocating these rights.152 
 The Austrian School’s general principle regarding freedom from 
contract is very similar to that of the Chicago school. Individuals will 
enter into contracts when they determine that, according to their 
own subjective valuations, the transactions will increase their util-
ity.153 Despite the subjective nature of these transactions, when they 
are combined into a market the result is an objective increase in net 
utility.154 It is not always the case that all utility-maximizing trans-
actions will be entered into because information, rationality, and en-
trepreneurship are not perfect.155 However, individual actors should 
be allowed to enter into transactions which are not perfect because, 
though not instantly realizing the optimal gains from a perfect 
transaction, the individual actor will become more knowledgeable 
and a better entrepreneur. In the long run this will lead to those in-
dividuals entering into more efficient transactions and contributing 
to accurate product valuation by the market. Also, it is virtually im-
possible for an outside actor to know whether the transaction not 
voluntarily entered into by the actor would have been subjectively 
beneficial to him because economists know nothing about an indi-
vidual’s utility.156 More fundamentally, there is no way for a third 
party to calculate whether the benefit for one party is greater than 
the cost for another party, because interpersonal comparisons of 
utility are impossible.157 
 In order to get a more detailed understanding of the two schools’ 
jurisprudential positions on honoring freedom from contract, their 
positions on monopoly and eminent domain will be examined.  
1.   Monopoly 
 Antitrust laws are applied to deconcentrate a market when it is 
dominated by a single or very few actors.158 According to a system of 
justice based upon Lockean natural rights, the owners of a property 
                                                                                                                     
 152. Id. at 13. 
 153. ROTHBARD, supra note 106, at 84-91. 
 154. See ROTHBARD, supra note 106, at 113-23; supra note 140. 
 155. KIRZNER, supra note 132, at 121-33, 135-36. Individuals are both rationally igno-
rant and radically ignorant. Rational ignorance occurs when an individual knows the costs 
and benefits of acquiring information and rationally chooses against investing the re-
sources to acquire that information. Radical ignorance occurs when an individual is not 
even aware of the possibility of gaining that information. Remedying radical ignorance is a 
task of the Austrian school which the Chicago school assumes away and, therefore, does 
not take on. The Austrian school sees the problem of radical ignorance arising from low 
levels of perceptiveness. See Ikeda, supra note 137, at 23. 
 156. ROTHBARD, supra note 106, at 84-89, 238-41. 
 157. Id. at 258-61. 
 158. W. KIP VISCUSI ET AL., ECONOMICS OF REGULATION AND ANTITRUST 257-62 (3d ed. 
2000). 
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right must be free from contract. Breaching this principle violates 
their natural property rights.159 Property rights equally apply to le-
gitimate interests in a business.160 As such, the application of anti-
trust law uniformly violates an individual’s natural property right.161  
 The monopolization of a market is unquestionably not allowed in 
the Chicago school.162 A primary assumption of the Chicago school is 
that the market operates in near-perfect competition.163 According to 
the Chicago school, in the state of perfect competition, there is a com-
                                                                                                                     
 159. It is noteworthy that Locke actually included a proviso to his theory of acquisition 
which limited the extent to which one individual could acquire property from the state of 
nature. “For this Labour being the unquestionable property of the Labourer . . . at least 
where there is enough, and as good left in common for others.” LOCKE, supra note 6, at 19. 
However, this “exception” has been discredited by classical liberal scholars. The criticisms 
are on the grounds that the proviso is self-contradictory, that the original assumption that 
all resources are given to man in common is incorrect, or that it is incorrect to ever apply 
the proviso because individual appropriation never worsens the conditions of others. E.g., 
Carl Watner, The Proprietary Theory of Justice in the Libertarian Tradition, 6 J. LIBERTAR-
IAN STUD. 289, 298-303 (1982). For arguments that nonappropriated property is held by no 
one, see RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT 
DOMAIN 11-12 (1985) [hereinafter EPSTEIN, TAKINGS]; Epstein, supra note 71, at 1228-28; 
Roger Pilon, The United States Supreme Court’s Treatment of Property (forthcoming 2007) 
(manuscript at 8-10, on file with author). Even if Locke’s proviso is correct, I contend that 
the proper application would be in the narrowest sense of monopoly—where there is no 
substitute to be found for a true necessity such as food, water, or shelter. In the analysis of 
a necessity, the relevant market would not be a particular type of the necessity (that is, 
one owner of all apple orchards), but rather all food (that is, one owner of the only supply of 
food on an island). 
 160. Just as there is no distinction between property created with one’s hands and that 
which is created with one’s mind, see supra note 67 and accompanying text, there is no dis-
tinction between physical and intellectual property. Richard Epstein, Liberty v. Property? 
Cracks in the Foundations of Copyright Law, 42 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1, 20-25 (2005). But see 
Tom W. Bell, Indelicate Imbalancing in Copyright and Patent Law, in COPYFIGHTS: THE 
FUTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE INFORMATION AGE 1 (2002). 
 161. Roger Pilon, Corporations and Rights: On Treating Corporate People Justly, 13 
GA. L. REV. 1245, 1342-45 (1979); see id. at 1320-27; D.T. ARMENTANO, ANTITRUST POLICY: 
THE CASE FOR REPEAL 69-70 (1986); ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE CAUSES OF THE 
WEALTH OF NATIONS 144 (1976) (1776). “People of the same trade seldom meet together, 
even for merriment aand diversion, but the conversation ends in a conspiracy against the 
public, or in some contrivance to raise prices. It is impossible indeed to prevent such meet-
ing, by any law shuch could be executed, or would be consistent with liberty and justice.” 
Id. (Supporters of anti-trust policy often cite the first half of this phrase, but conveniently 
leave the second half out. Of course, Smith’s objection could be interpreted only as applica-
ble to restrictions on freedom of speech or assembly. However, given that Smith’s main 
concern in the treatise was private ownership of property, his comment almost certainly 
was directed against the idea of laws limiting an owner’s control over his property right in 
his business.). 
 162. POSNER, supra note 89, at 295-308. However, recently, a large number of Chicago 
theorists have allowed for small degrees of market concentration for circumstances such as 
economies of scale and “natural” monopolies. See ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST 
PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF (2d ed. Free Press 1993) (Bork, a noted Chicago 
school lawyer, describes a number of efficiency increases from market concentration, raises 
the rarity of monopolistic market concentration, and determines that the resources used to 
police antitrust policies are oftentimes wasted.); MERCURO & MEDEMA, supra note 80, at 
148-51.  
 163. VISCUSI ET AL., supra note 158, at 73-78. 
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petitive level of output and price.164 In contrast, if a monopoly arises, 
it will restrict output and increase price in order to maximize prof-
its.165 Additionally—because the state of monopoly is so advanta-
geous—in order to reach or maintain this state an actor will expend 
resources.166 An expense of resources to reach or maintain a monopo-
listic state does not serve any beneficial market purpose, so this ef-
fort is a misallocation of resources.167 Furthermore, in the absence of 
direct seller rivalry, monopoly suppliers can afford to become “lazy” 
and use their resources less efficiently.168 In sum, compared to the 
market of perfect competition, a monopoly will choose actions that mis-
allocate resources and reduce social welfare.169 The Chicago school also 
thoroughly opposes any government creation of a monopoly.170 
 The Austrian school recognizes the inefficiencies of monopolies, 
but holds that “true” monopolies cannot naturally occur.171 Further-
more, the Mises-Rothbard project claims that if a true monopoly oc-
curred, no measurement besides that of the market could determine 
the most efficient levels of price and quantity.172 Finally, because the 
Austrian school accepts product differentiation, by definition—to a 
degree—all producers are monopolist.173 All sellers hold unique 
                                                                                                                     
 164. Id. 
 165. Id. at 78-80. This inefficiency is referred to as “dead weight loss.” 
 166. Id. at 85-86. Firm efforts will take the form of both jockeying within the market-
place (that is, through advertisement) and for government favors. The literature on rent-
seeking behavior details the lengths to which firms will go to achieve government-provided 
and -protected market share. 
 167. Id. 
 168. Id. at 84-85. This is referred to as “X-inefficiency.” 
 169. Id. at 86-88. 
 170. MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 129-31 (2d ed. 1982) (focusing on 
government-created labor monopolies resulting from imposing licensing requirements, 
granting legal immunity to labor unions, and selectively not arresting or prosecuting union 
members when they break laws in the name of striking) Government-created monopolies 
include any form of protection or favoritism given by the government. Such assistance can 
arise through regulation, trade barriers, and outright grants of monopoly status. The nega-
tive consequences of government-created monopolies are the same as those of traditionally 
occurring monopolies, so the Chicago school opposes them. DAVID FRIEDMAN, supra note 9, 
at 39-45. See generally infra note 189 (describing recent legal treatment of government 
created monopolies). 
 171. One group within the Austrian school holds that the only natural occurrence of a 
monopoly is when a single party has absolute control over an essential input—for example, 
all the orange trees and orange seeds. Jerome Ellig, Industrial Organization, in THE 
ELGAR COMPANION TO AUSTRIAN ECONOMICS, supra note 90, at 244, 246. Mises and 
Kirzner are amongst this group. Id. Another group doubts even this possibility of monop-
oly. This group concludes that many times when a single party has complete control over a 
market, the profits being realized will provide enough incentive for entrepreneurs to dis-
cover new technology with which to break into the market. There will, in theory, be in-
stances where no technology advancements will allow entrepreneurs to break into the 
market, but it is impossible to tell when this would be the case. Id. Rothbard and Rizzo are 
members of this group. Id. 
 172. Id. 
 173. ROTHBARD, supra note 106, at 666-71. 
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niches that are without perfect competitors and, as a result, they 
capture profits that are above marginal cost.174 These true profits, 
however, are not problematic but, rather, necessary signals for the 
wider market’s reallocation of resources.175 Because entrepreneurs 
are so effective at capturing true profit, it is claimed by many Austri-
ans that absent the use of force,176 no efforts of a monopolist will be 
able to effectively keep competitors out of a market.177 
 It is further claimed by some that even if a monopoly could be 
formed, output and price could not be identified as being at monopo-
list levels.178 This is a result of the Austrian conclusion that output 
curves are not smooth and that the true cost of an item is the alter-
native or opportunity foregone.179 As explained earlier,180 output 
curves are not smooth as a result of individuals not being able to 
make fine value distinctions.181 Whereas the neoclassical model can 
determine and compare the competitive price and quantity to the 
monopolistic price and quantity, as illustrated in Figure 4, the Aus-
trians believe that the lack of smoothness to the curve makes this 
impossible, as illustrated in Figures 5 and 6.182 Furthermore, an out-
side observer cannot determine the value of a good to an individual 
actor because the true value is either the cost of the alternative to 
acquiring the good or the foregone opportunity. The value of the al-
ternative is entirely subjective, and the economist can only observe 
ordinal measurements,183 so the observer has no information on the 
actors’ subjective valuation of the alternatives.184 
                                                                                                                     
 174. KIRZNER, supra note 132, at 123-25; ISRAEL M. KIRZNER, THE DRIVING FORCE OF THE 
MARKET–ESSAYS IN AUSTRIAN ECONOMICS 19 (2000) [hereinafter KIRZNER, DRIVING FORCE]. 
 175. Id. 
 176. For example, consider government-created monopolies, the labor unions of the 
early 1900s (which used force against “scabs”), or companies such as DeBeers Diamonds, 
which, in the past, used violence to consolidate ownership of diamond mines. 
 177. ROTHBARD, supra note 106, at 651-53, 659-61. 
 178. See id. at 687-98. Not all Austrians would agree with this point. 
 179. See supra note 120. 
 180. See supra notes 119-16 and accompanying text. 
 181. See id. 
 182. See id. 
 183. See supra notes 106-16 and accompanying text. 
 184. See id. 
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 To the extent that “small monopolies”185 occur, the Austrian school 
does not hold that their existence is inefficient.186 Instead, the price-
taking that small monopolies get is necessary to signal the realloca-
tion of the market’s resources.187 This price-taking is also a necessary 
motivation for entrepreneurs.188 
 According to the Austrian school, the only possible existence of a 
real monopoly occurs because of government force or government-
sanctioned force.189 A government-created monopoly embodies the 
negative characteristics of restricting output and increasing price but 
prevents market forces from facilitating competitors entering the 
market to capture profit by undermining the inefficiencies. Because 
of this, a government-created monopoly should never occur.190 
2.   Eminent Domain 
 Eminent domain is the legal procedure by which a governmental 
entity can forcibly acquire land owned by a private party.191 The pro-
                                                                                                                     
 185. A “small monopoly” is a seller who is not in perfect competition and is taking some 
real profits. In a small monopoly there is still, however, a substantial level of competition. 
 186. Ellig, supra note 171, at 244-45. 
 187. Id. 
 188. Id.; KIRZNER, DRIVING FORCE, supra note 174, at 19; Rothbard, supra note 97, at 30-31. 
 189. ROTHBARD, supra note 106, at 668-71, 747-48. Rothbard defines government-
created monopolies very broadly to include required licensing, required quality standards, 
tariffs, immigration restrictions, minimum wage laws, and maximum hour laws. Id. at 
1089-14. There is some disagreement within the Austrian school over whether a monopoly 
can arise due to environmental characteristics or not. See supra note 171. Even if there can 
be, there is also disagreement over whether this monopoly could be identified. Id. Fur-
thermore, there is controversy over whether such monopoly could be accurately valued by a 
third party. Id. Of note, the common law of the 16th, 17th, and 18th centuries embodied a 
similar position to this. This common law position was that only a grant of exclusive right 
or a restriction of labor to an economic activity was a monopoly. See Darcy v. Allein, 77 
Eng. Rep. 1260 (K.B. 1062); The Case of Tailors of Ipswich, 77 Eng. Rep. 1218 (K.B. 1614); 
BERNARD H. SIEGAN, ECONOMIC LIBERTIES AND THE CONSTITUTION 21-24 (2d ed. 2006). 
Grants of monopoly were prohibited by the crown but, according to most interpretations, 
allowed by parliament. SIEGAN, supra, at 22. Since the early part of the 20th century, U.S. 
jurisprudence has struck down certain types of interstate protectionism under the dormant 
commerce clause, see Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460 (2005) (holding that a state requir-
ing greater burdens for out of state wine shipments than in state shipments violated the 
dormant commerce clause, even in light of the Twenty-First Amendment), but for the most 
part has not struck down local protectionism. Compare Powers v. Harris, 379 F.3d 1208, 
1221 (10th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 544 U.S. 920 (2005) (stating that “economic protection-
ism constitutes a legitimate state interest. . . . [W]hile baseball may be the national pas-
time of the citizenry, dishing out special economic benefits to certain in-state interests re-
mains the favored pastime of state and local governments.”), with Craigmiles v. Giles, 312 
F.3d 220, 224 (6th Cir. 2002) (stating that “protecting a discrete interest group from eco-
nomic competition is not a legitimate governmental purpose”). (Note the circuit split on the 
issue. The split was emphasized in the Tenth Circuit’s opinion, presumably to encourage 
the Supreme Court to accept certiorari). 
 190. ROTHBARD, supra note 106, at 668-71, 747-48; MURRAY N. ROTHBARD, POWER AND 
MARKET: GOVERNMENT AND THE ECONOMY (1970), reprinted in MAN, ECONOMY AND STATE WITH 
POWER AND MARKET 1047, 1089-1114 (Scholars ed.,Ludwig von Mises Inst. 2004) (1970). 
 191. See 1 JULIUS L. SACKMAN, NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN § 1.11 (rev. 3d ed. 2001). 
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tection of Lockean natural rights does not allow for the forceful ex-
propriation of one’s property—whether the land acquired is for public 
use, public purpose, or private use. Unless an injury is being rectified, 
the only just transfer of a property interest is done voluntarily.192 
 The Chicago school allows the use of eminent domain for a num-
ber of reasons. The most common economic justification for eminent 
domain is that it is necessary to break a land owner’s monopoly.193 
For almost identical reasons as to why monopolies are not allowed in 
competitive markets for goods and services, they are also not allowed 
for real property.194 For example, train companies that need to pur-
chase property from multiple owners in order to build a straight 
track and large building projects which need to purchase property 
from multiple owners in order to avoid the “leopard effect”195 face the 
danger of individuals holding out in order to capitalize on their posi-
tion of leverage. 
 Typical Chicago school analysis, so far as it objectively values 
property, would also allow for eminent domain to override a property 
owner’s subjective “overvaluation” of their land. However, it is note-
worthy that the Chicago school does not purposively value property 
objectively instead of subjectively.196 The school’s purpose in overlook-
ing the individual’s subjective valuation is to create a system-wide 
model.197 Perhaps in light of this, in the case of eminent domain of 
private homes some Chicago school scholars recently have deviated 
somewhat from this pure doctrine of objective valuation.198 It is un-
                                                                                                                     
 192. NOZICK, supra note 20, at 149-53 (discussing the entitlement theory of distribu-
tive justice). 
 193. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS, supra note 159, at 164-65; Richard Posner, Foreword: A Politi-
cal Court, 119 HARV. L. REV. 31, 94-95 (2005); see POSNER, supra note 89, at 61-68. “A 
good economic argument for eminent domain, although one with greater application for 
railroads and other right of way companies than to the government [i.e. schools, parks, 
and municipal buildings], is that it is necessary to prevent monopoly.” Id. at 62. “The 
only justification for eminent domain is that sometimes a landowner may be in a posi-
tion to exercise holdout power, enabling him to obtain a monopoly rent in the absence of 
an eminent domain right.” Posting of Richard Posner to The Becker-Posner Blog: The 
Kelo Case, Public Use and Eminent Domain, http://www.becker-posner-
blog.com/archives/2005/06/the_kelo_case_p.html (June 26, 2005). Here Posner states that 
he does not know whether the plaintiff in the Kelo case, Susette Kelo, was indeed a hold-
out, but implies that if she were the case was properly decided. 
 194. POSNER, supra note 89, at 62-63. 
 195. The term “leopard effect” is used to describe the landscape of a development that 
is spotted with various land owners who could not be bought out by a developer. 
 196. See supra notes 87-90 and 94-95 and accompanying text 
 197. Id. 
 198. POSNER, supra note 89, at 62. 
The familiar argument that the eminent domain power is necessary to over-
come the stubbornness of people who refuse to sell at a “reasonable” (that is, 
the market) price is bad economics. If I refuse to sell for less than $250,000 a 
house that no one else would pay more than $100,000 for, it does not follow 
that I am irrational, even if no “objective” factors such moving expenses justify 
my insisting on such a premium. It follows that I value the house more than 
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certain how far these Chicago school economists would extend this 
exception, but for the very reason that recognizing subjective value in 
this case is already an exception, it is hard to believe that they would 
extend it to many other circumstances. 
 As a result of the Chicago school allowing for the determination of 
utility through cardinal measurements, it also allows for the inter-
personal comparison of utility. Through interpersonal comparisons of 
utility, eminent domain can be justified as utility-maximizing.199 
 The most notable achievement by the Chicago school is the reallo-
cation of property rights in a manner that compensates for high 
transaction costs.200 According to the Coase theorem, high transac-
tion costs prevent the reassignment of property rights to the most ef-
ficient holder.201 In such a case, the court should reallocate those 
rights to the party they would be held by absent the high transaction 
cost.202 This theory has been applied by the school to eminent do-
main.203 While the school identifies many problems in the use of emi-
nent domain, such as the encouragement of rent-seeking and bad de-
cisions due to the assigned fair market value being too low,204 when 
those variables can be removed or screened by a judge, then in cer-
tain circumstances an action brought about through eminent domain 
can be Pareto-optimal.205 
                                                                                                                     
other people. This extra value has the same status in economic analysis as any 
other value.  
Id. “Maybe [subjective values could be determined]. Ancient Athens had a clever method of 
self-assessment for property tax purposes: Anyone could force you to sell your property to 
him at your self-assessed valuation.” Id. at 75 n.3. 
 199. See Thomas W. Merrill, The Economics of Public Use, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 61, 90-
93 (1987) (Merrill is a Chicago economist who leaves open this possibility); Walter Block, 
Coase and Kelo: Ominous Parallels and Reply to Lott on Rothbard on Coase, 27 WHITTIER 
L. REV. 997, 997-1014 (2006) (Block is an Austrian economist and here explains how Chi-
cago analysis can endorse eminent domain takings in situations such as Kelo v. New Lon-
don, 125 S.Ct. 2655 (2005)). 
 200. [W]hen market transactions are so costly as to make it difficult to change 
the arrangement of rights established by the law.  In such cases, the courts 
directly influence economic activity. It would therefore seem desirable that 
the courts should understand the economic consequences of their decisions 
and should, insofar as this is possible without creating too much uncertainty 
about the legal position itself, take these consequences into account when 
making their decisions.  
R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 19 (1960). 
 201. Id. at 13, 15-16.  
 202. Id. at 29-34, 36-38. “Actually, very little analysis is required to show that an ideal 
world is better than a state of laissez faire . . . .” Id. at 27. 
 203. See Merrill, supra note 199, at 90-93; A. Mitchell Polinsky, Resolving Nuisance 
Disputes: The Simple Economics of Injunctive and Damage Remedies, 32 STAN. L. REV. 
1075, 1088 (1980). 
 204. See Merrill, supra note 199, at 75-77, 81-88. 
 205. See James Geoffrey Durham, Efficient Just Compensation as a Limit on Eminent 
Domain, 69 MINN. L. REV. 1277, 1300-04 (1985). “In eminent domain actions, therefore, 
Pareto Optimality is achieved when the owners of the property taken are fully compen-
sated for the costs of the actions.” Id. at 1279 n.12. 
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 As many proponents of the Austrian school do not accept that 
there can be true monopolies absent government-authorized force, 
they do not believe in the use of eminent domain to break up land 
owners’ monopolies.206 The Austrian school holds that in almost all 
cases where it is thought that a land owner possesses a monopoly, in re-
ality there is not one.207 There are multiple alternatives that are not ex-
plored by the parties precisely because eminent domain is an option. For 
example, common tools proposed by Austrian economists to eliminate 
the holdout problem are the purchase of call options on alternative land 
plots,208 secret purchases,209 and combination auctions.210  
 As the Austrian school strictly values land subjectively, it does not 
allow for eminent domain to be used to undermine a property owner’s 
“overvaluation” of his land.211 Furthermore, because the Austrians 
are very skeptical of an individual judge’s ability to determine the 
market value of the property, they do not believe that a judge can ac-
curately accomplish the task of valuation.212 
 As a result of the Austrian school’s strict adherence to subjective 
valuation and its denial of the ability to use cardinal measurements, 
it is impossible to make interpersonal comparisons of utility. As such, 
                                                                                                                     
 206. Bruce L. Benson, The Mythology of Holdout as a Justification for Eminent Domain 
and Public Provision of Roads, 10 INDEP. R. 165, 168-173 (2005), available at 
http://www.independent.org/pdf/tir/tir_10_2_1_benson.pdf; see Walter Block & Matthew 
Block, Roads, Bridges, Sunlight, and Private Property Rights, 7 J. ECON. STUD. HUMAN. 
351 (June-Sept. 1996), available at http://141.164.133.3/faculty/Block/ Blockarti-
cles/roads1_vol7.htm); Walter Block & Richard Epstein, Debate, Debate on Eminent Do-
main, 1 N.Y.U. J.L. LIBERTY 1144, 1149-50, 1157 (2006) (Professor Block asserts that emi-
nent domain is not necessary to efficiently assemble land for roads.) It is noteworthy that 
Block’s proposal is in large part reliant upon a rejection of the ad coelum doctrine and in-
stead upon having a more strict application of land that is homesteaded (that is, one has 
not homesteaded the land underneath his home). 
 207. See Benson, supra note 206. Benson also proposes that in the case where the 
seller is only transferring part of his property the holdout problem is much less than is 
commonly thought. This is due to the frequent increase in the value of the remainder of his 
property. Id. at 170. 
 208. Block & Epstein, supra note 206, at 1149-50. 
 209. Benson, supra note 206, at 170-71 (Benson points out that while efforts to keep 
government transactions secret can be undermined by public disclosure laws, large pur-
chases by private actors do not suffer the same problem. These kind of private transactions 
traditionally are able to be made quickly. He proposes that projects traditionally done by 
the public where the land is acquired through eminent domain, such as the construction 
and management of roads, should instead be done privately. Consequently, they could keep 
their acquisition secret.). 
 210. Id. at 171-73 (citing STEVEN E. LANDSBURG, THE ARMCHAIR ECONOMIST AND 
EVERYDAY LIFE 29-30 (1993)). (Note: this method requires at least two options to leverage 
against each other.) 
 211. According to the Austrian methodology, the only value is the subjective value. 
There is no such thing as the objective value. Hence, there can be no objective valuation. 
Horwitz, supra note 90. Note that Posner recently agreed with this in the context of emi-
nent domain. See supra note 198. 
 212. See supra note 142. 
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eminent domain cannot be justified as a transfer of resources to a 
party who values it more. 
 Finally, the Austrian school does not agree with the Coase theo-
rem’s need to reallocate resources in the case of high transaction 
cost.213 As such, it would not use eminent domain in such a fashion.214 
 Both the Chicago and Austrian schools provide a high level of 
general protection for an individual’s natural right to freedom from 
contract. However, despite the general protection that the Chicago 
school provides, the school actively undermines the natural right to 
freedom of contract in the case of monopoly and often actively un-
dermines the right through the use of eminent domain power. 
B.   Freedom to Contract 
 Freedom to contract is the freedom to voluntarily enter into le-
gally binding agreements.215 According to a system of justice based 
upon Lockean natural rights, an individual’s voluntary choice to en-
ter into a contract must be honored.216 To restrict this freedom is to 
violate the individual’s natural rights.217 
 The general principle of the Chicago school regarding freedom to 
contract is that contracts which are entered into freely maximize 
wealth because actors with perfect knowledge and rationality will en-
ter into agreements that provide the greatest increase of utility.218 
Through individuals freely contracting, markets are able to accu-
rately assign the true costs of goods and allocate them to their most 
efficient use.219 As contracts serve no purpose other than facilitating 
individual transactions that are themselves utility-maximizing, each 
contract must, ex ante, maximize the utility of both parties.220 For 
these reasons, the Chicago school is generally extremely protective of 
the right to freedom of contract.221 The Chicago school would almost 
universally support the holding of the historic Lochner case222 and 
overturn minimum wage laws, collective bargaining statutes, man-
                                                                                                                     
 213. KIRZNER, DRIVING FORCE, supra note 174, at 260 (proposing that if there were a 
method to increase utility by altering transaction costs, astute entrepreneurs in the mar-
ket would have created and exercised this method). See generally Block, supra note 134 
(taking on the application of the Coase theory by the Chicago scholars referenced in the ti-
tle and showing how their analysis is both unnecessary and destructive through undermin-
ing private property rights); ROTHBARD, supra note 142, at 124-25. 
 214. Block, supra note 134; see also supra notes 206-13. 
 215. See supra note 77 and accompanying text. 
 216. See supra notes 73-79 and accompanying text.  
 217. Id.  
 218. See supra note 147. 
 219. See id. 
 220. See id. 
 221. See id. 
 222. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (striking down the State of New York’s 
economic regulation of the maximum weekly working hours for bread bakers).  
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datory pension statutes, insurance regulation, and even antidis-
crimination laws223 and building codes.224 
 The general principle of the Austrian school regarding freedom to 
contract is that it serves two purposes. For an Austrian economist, it 
is important to recognize that actors have varying levels of  informa-
tion. Very few have near-perfect information, and most are rationally 
or even radically ignorant.225 For actors who do have a high level of 
information and effective entrepreneurial perceptiveness, freedom of 
contract allows for a transaction that is highly utility increasing.226 
For those actors who do not have a high level of information, freedom 
of contract increases entrepreneurial perceptiveness, leading to their 
future transactions involving terms that bring the market closer to 
the accurate valuation of the product.227 Most importantly, though, 
freedom of contract is the most effective method by which informa-
tion can be collected and refined to determine the actual value of a 
good or service.228 The Austrian school does not defend freedom of 
contract because it produces perfect efficiency but rather because it—
more so than any judicial or legislative intervention—produces out-
comes which are both immediately efficient and lead to the greatest 
increase in future efficiency.229 Additionally, the Austrian school 
holds that because the contract chosen is that of the greatest utility, 
when a contracting party’s primary option is removed the alternative 
is necessarily of lesser value.230 As with the Chicago school, the Aus-
trian school would support the holding of Lochner and overturn 
minimum wage laws, collective bargaining statutes, mandatory pen-
                                                                                                                     
 223. GARY S. BECKER, THE ECONOMICS OF DISCRIMINATION 19-38 (2d ed. 1971); 
RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS: THE CASE AGAINST EMPLOYMENT 
DISCRIMINATION LAWS 32-78 (1992); see POSNER, supra note 89, at 365-71. 
 224. See POSNER, supra note 89, at 685-89; Herbert Hovenkamp, The Political Econ-
omy of Substantive Due Process, 40 STAN. L. REV. 379, 384-95 (1987); see also Richard S. 
Markovits, The Distributive Impact, Allocative Efficiency, and Overall Desirability of Ideal 
Housing Codes: Some Theoretical Clarifications, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1815, 1831 (1976) (dis-
cussing building codes). 
 225. KIRZNER, supra note 132, at 121-33, 135-36.  
 226. According to the Austrian school, it would be very rare for an individual to have 
perfect information, so the transaction will not be utility-maximizing. However, to the ex-
tent that an individual’s information is good and the decisions are rational, the transaction 
will increase utility. 
 227. See, e.g., KIRZNER, supra note 132, at 124-27, 148-51 (Kirzner distinguishes be-
tween increasing efficiency through encouraging individuals to act more rationally, in-
creasing their efficiency in acquiring information, and increasing the effort they dedicate to 
acquiring information and designing economic structures that encourage those with 
greater natural ability act rationally and acquire information to act frequently. All of these 
consequences increase economic utility.).  
 228. See F.A. Von Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, in THE ESSENCE OF HAYEK, 
supra note 101, at 211, 211-223. 
 229. See F.A. HAYEK, Competition as a Discovery Procedure, in THE ESSENCE OF 
HAYEK, supra note 101, at 254, 260-61.  
 230. HANS-HERMANN HOPPE, A THEORY OF SOCIALISM AND CAPITALISM 15 (1989). 
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sion statutes, insurance regulation, antidiscrimination laws, and 
building codes.231 
 In order to get a more detailed understanding of the two schools’ 
jurisprudential positions on honoring freedom to contract, their posi-
tions on breach of contract due to impossibility, frustration of pur-
pose, or impracticability; mistake; force or fraud; and unconscionabil-
ity will be examined.  
1.   Impossibility, Frustration of Purpose, and Impracticability 
 The defense of impossibility arises when a party’s performance is 
made nearly or absolutely impossible “without his fault by the occur-
rence of an event the non-occurrence of which was a basic assump-
tion on which the contract was made.”232 The doctrine of frustration 
of purpose arises when performance of the contract is physically pos-
sible but at least one party’s underlying purpose of the contract is no 
longer attainable.233  The doctrine of impracticability arises when the 
performance of a contract is deemed impractical.234 Impracticality is 
based upon the terms of the contract no longer being mutually bene-
ficial.235 The Lockean natural rights position on these three defenses 
is premised on the foundations that the parties are obligated to honor 
the conditions to which they voluntarily agreed.236 In the cases of 
frustration of purpose and impracticability, the terms voluntarily 
agreed to must be upheld; efficient breach is not legitimate. Specific 
performance is the closest to the actual terms agreed to, but in many 
cases the more realistic remedy is expectation damages.237 In the case 
                                                                                                                     
 231. ROTHBARD, supra note 106, at 892-900. (We are only interested here in the sup-
port by Rothbard and other Austrian school scholars for the economic effect of Lochner’s 
doctrine, not their opinion of the jurisprudence of substantive due process or a broader 
reading of the Privileges or Immunities clause.) 
 232. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 261 (1981). 
 233. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 265 (1981); see Krell v. Henry,  (1903) 2 
K.B. 740, (excusing a contract where the plaintiff rented an apartment to view a coronation 
procession but the procession was cancelled).  
 234. Performance of the contract is physically possible and the underlying conditions of 
the bargain achievable, but as a result of an unexpected event enforcement of the promise 
would entail a much higher cost than originally contemplated. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
CONTRACTS § 261 (1981); see Mineral Park Land Co. v. Howard, 156 P. 458, 459-60 (Cal. 
1916) (holding a contract to extract grave impossible where the defendants discovered after 
making the contract that extracting gravel was cost prohibitive).  
 235. See id. 
 236. See FRIED, supra note 68, at 17-21; Barnett, Consent Theory, supra note 45, at 
296-300; supra note 74. 
 237. See FRIED, supra note 68, at 17, 21-22; Peter Benson, The Idea of a Public Basis of 
Justification for Contract, 33 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 273, 321-26 (1995). See generally supra 
note 74. But see Richard Craswell, Contract Law, Default Rules, and the Philosophy of 
Promising, 88 MICH. L. REV. 489 (1989); Richard Craswell, Expectation Damages and Con-
tract Theory Revisited 1-22 (Stan. L. Sch. Working Paper No. 325, Aug. 2006), available at 
http://ssrn.con/abstract=925980 (Craswell asserts that theories deriving from personal 
autonomy, such as Fried’s and Barnett’s, do not demand any one type of remedy. His claim 
2007]                          MORAL DUTY  529 
 
of true impossibility, since the party has no choice but to breach, 
he has a duty to rectify the non-breaching party for the entire ex-
pectation damages.238  
 The Chicago school recognizes the defense of impossibility, frus-
tration of purpose, and impracticability to avoid honoring a con-
tract.239 The three doctrines are necessary to the Chicago school be-
cause the school’s assumption is that any contract must be, ex ante, 
mutually beneficial.240 The Chicago school allows for the legal defense 
of impossibility, frustration of purpose, and impracticability when 
the promisee is the superior risk bearer.241 Such a defense is only 
available so far as the circumstance is not contractually provided 
for.242 In the case of impracticability, if a contract were to become im-
practical, it should be breached and the party who, ex ante, would 
have been able to insure against the risk of breach should bear the 
cost.243 An example of this can be seen in a contract for one party to 
produce a good for another. For example, if the costs of production 
were to rise more than fifty percent, making the cost of production 
greater than the contracted sale price,244 the Chicago school would 
discharge the contract if at the formation of the contract the per-
former was in a worse position to insure against the risk.245 The cost 
of this excuse should be allocated to whichever party would have 
been better able to insure against this risk.246 
 The Austrian school allows for almost no use of impossibility or 
impracticability. According to the Austrian theory, only the agree-
ment that the parties reached can measure the true value of the 
products and services exchanged.247 If an actor misvalues the risk or 
benefits of a contract, then he has behaved as an inefficient actor.248 
Such behavior must be discouraged, as bad judgments by actors mis-
allocate resources and contribute to skewing the market’s value of 
                                                                                                                     
is largely based upon the understanding that a contract is not simply for a product or ser-
vice, but for that item under a set of conditions, such as different remedies upon breach. 
None of those conditions are more legitimate than the other, so it is inaccurate to suppose 
that the default remedy consistent with autonomy is any one of them.). 
 238. See id.  
 239. See Richard A. Posner & Andrew M. Rosenfield, Impossibility and Related Doc-
trines in Contract Law: An Economic Analysis, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 83, 90-91 (1977).  
 240. See Kronman & Posner, supra note 147, at 1-3. 
 241. See Posner & Rosenfield, supra note 239, at 90-91, 97-98, 117. 
 242. Id. at 90. 
 243. Id. at 83-85. 
 244. Iowa Elec. Light & Power Co. v. Atlas Corp., 467 F. Supp. 129, 139-40 (N.D. Iowa 
1978), rev’d on other grounds, 603 F.2d 1301 (8th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 911 (1980). 
 245. Posner & Rosenfield, supra note 239, at 90-91. 
 246. Id.  
 247. See Rothbard, supra note 140, at 106-26. This is because values are purely subjec-
tive and an individual’s preferences can only be measured through his action.  
 248. See KIRZNER, DRIVING FORCE, supra note 174; supra note 137. 
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the good or service.249 As such, discouragement of bad judgment and 
encouragement of good judgment by actors is a necessary precondi-
tion to increasing the efficiency of resource allocation.250 To allow a 
party to escape financially costly performance under a contract be-
cause he failed to use efficient entrepreneurship to predict future 
costs when the other party did does not provide the necessary en-
couragement of efficient entrepreneurship needed to increase the 
market’s greater efficiency.251 Efficient entrepreneurship occurs in 
large part because efficient entrepreneurs are rewarded while ineffi-
cient entrepreneurs are punished.252  
 The only scenario under which the Austrian school would allow 
the defenses of impossibility, frustration of purpose, or impracticabil-
ity is when both parties assumed that the risk would not occur and 
no level of entrepreneurial perceptiveness reasonably could have con-
tradicted either party’s assumptions.253 For example, in the previ-
ously mentioned case where the cost of production increased more 
than fifty percent, the Austrian school would not discharge the par-
ties’ obligations under the contract.254 Under this and most circum-
stances, perceptive entrepreneurs could have reasonably perceived 
this risk. Such perceptive entrepreneurship needs to be encouraged, 
not made irrelevant.255 In contrast, the famous case of Taylor v. 
Caldwell is an instance when, arguably, no level of entrepreneurial 
ability would have been able to prevent the impossibility of perform-
ing the contract.256 
 In this area of contract law, the Chicago school’s jurisprudence 
provides a moderate level of conflict with the protection of Lockean 
natural rights. The Austrian school’s jurisprudence more thoroughly 
protects Lockean natural rights. There are a small number of in-
stances, though, where the Austrian school would allow efficient 
                                                                                                                     
 249. Id. The proper valuation of goods and services by the market is fundamental to ef-
ficiency. See MISES, supra note 106, at 257-59. “The [unfettered] market process is the ad-
justment of the individual actions of the various members of the market society . . . . The 
market prices tell the producers what to produce, how to produce and in what quantity. . . . 
It is the center from which the activities of the individuals radiate.” Id at 258; see 
Rothbard, supra note 140, at 19-20, 85-87. 
 250. See KIRZNER, supra note 132, at 132, 135-36, 148-49, 215-17; sources cited supra 
note 249. 
 251. See sources cited supra note 250. 
 252. See id. 
 253. See Christopher T. Wonnell, Contract Law and the Austrian School of Economics, 
54 FORDHAM L. REV. 507, 526-27 (1986). 
 254. See id. 
 255. See supra note 227.  
 256. See Taylor v. Caldwell (1863) 122 Eng. Rep. 309, 312, 315 (K.B.) (holding a con-
tract for the rental of a music hall void because the hall burned to the ground); see also 
Wonnell, supra note 253 (stating that Taylor v. Caldwell fell within the category of cases in 
which both parties assumed a risk would not occur and no level of “entrepreneurial percep-
tiveness reasonably could have contradicted [that] assumption”). 
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breach on impracticability grounds because no entrepreneurial per-
ceptiveness reasonably could have contradicted either party’s as-
sumption. While a natural-rights-based policy would never allow for 
breach in a case of impracticability, the Austrian school would still 
protect natural rights in the majority of cases. 
2.   Defense of Mistake: The Duty to Disclose 
 The defense of mistake doctrine is accurately characterized as a 
duty to disclose information.257 The doctrine requires that, under cer-
tain circumstances, one party has a duty to disclose information to 
the other party.258 Information is not limited to facts but also includes 
creative insights. The Lockean natural rights position on defense of 
mistake is that there should be no legal duty to disclose.259 The natu-
ral freedom to contract is predicated on voluntariness, not knowl-
edge. If a party was incorrect about an assumed fact, this does not 
undermine voluntariness. Hence the mistake does not undermine the 
binding nature of the contract.260 Furthermore, one party has no 
right to information that the other possesses.261 An individual in no 
way has a Lockean natural right to information another possesses as 
a result of his own creation or has acquired through voluntary trans-
action. 
 The Chicago school universally prescribes some level of duty to 
disclose information.262 The level of disclosure required varies 
amongst scholars,263 but a middle position is that there is a duty to 
disclose information acquired without deliberate and costly effort but 
no duty to disclose information obtained with deliberate and costly 
efforts.264 This position reflects a desire to promote the acquisition of 
information through internalizing its benefits,265 but when possible 
requires the dissemination of information to all parties to reach per-
                                                                                                                     
 257. See Anthony T. Kronman, Mistake, Disclosure, Information, and the Laws of Con-
tracts, in THE ECONOMICS OF CONTRACT LAW, supra note 147, at 114, 117.  
 258. Id.  
 259. See supra notes 67-70 and accompanying text. See generally Walter Block, To-
wards a Libertarian Theory of Blackmail, 15 J. LIBERTARIAN STUD. 55, 55-58 (2001) (start-
ing from the position that one has a right to the information he creates or acquires legiti-
mately, Block deduces that blackmail should not be prohibited). 
 260. This is not to be mistaken with the “right to lie”—that is, fraud, which will be ad-
dressed later. 
 261. See supra note 259. 
 262. Richard Epstein supports a relatively high duty to disclose and calls the lack of 
disclosure “low-level frauds.” Richard Epstein et al., Coercion vs. Consent: A Reason Debate 
on How to Think About Liberty, REASON, Mar. 2004, at 40, 49, available at 
http://www.reason.com/0403/fe.ra.coercion.shtml. Richard Posner also equates a lack of dis-
closure to fraud. POSNER, supra note 89, at 111; M.J. Trebilcock, The Doctrine of Inequality of 
Bargaining Power, in THE ECONOMICS OF CONTRACT LAW, supra note 147, at 78, 84-85. 
 263. See id. 
 264. Kronman, supra note 257, at 118-21. See generally supra note 263. 
 265. See Kronman, supra note 257, at 118-21. 
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fect knowledge.266 The need to force the exchange of information be-
tween the parties is a product of the Chicago transaction being predi-
cated upon perfect information.267 
 The Austrian school is less amenable to the defense of mistake but 
does not discard it altogether.268 Proponents of the Austrian school do 
not assert that mistakes do not take place or that mistakes do not re-
sult in transactions that are not utility maximizing. Rather, Austri-
ans maintain that allowing mistakes to occur encourages more effi-
cient entrepreneurship.269 Knowing that they cannot rely upon a de-
fense of breach, parties will take better precautions to fully inform 
themselves prior to future transactions, actors who are good entre-
preneurs will be encouraged to engage in more transactions, and ac-
tors observing from the sidelines will be encouraged to follow the ex-
ample of the good entrepreneur.270  
 Entrepreneurship is also taken into account by the Austrian 
school as a skill for perceiving opportunities to acquire knowledge 
and using existing knowledge in the most effective way.271 The Chi-
cago school calculation of how costly information was to acquire, 
however, does not take into consideration the value of effective en-
trepreneurship.272 Allowing a party to breach a contract based upon 
mistake could amount to one party confiscating the gains from en-
trepreneurship that another party contributed.273  
 The Austrian school also recognizes the inefficiency of a bad con-
tract, and its analysis tends to mirror the Chicago “how costly was 
the information to acquire” test while also recognizing the value of 
entrepreneurial skill level.274 According to the Austrian school, if the 
information was a product of purposeful entrepreneurship, then it is 
not to be undermined and freely captured by the other party.275 
Therefore, there is no duty to disclose and the contract should not be 
                                                                                                                     
 266. In addition to the economic cost of a party not benefiting ex ante due to incom-
plete or bad information, there can be economic costs such as the redundant acquisition of 
information. POSNER, supra note 89, at 111. 
 267. See supra notes 147-52 and accompanying text. 
 268. Wonnell, supra note 253, at 528. 
 269. See KIRZNER, supra  note 132, at 132, 135-36, 148-49, 215-17. 
 270. See id. 
 271. See ROTHBARD, supra note 106, at 509-56; ISRAEL M. KIRZNER, Introduction to 
METHOD, PROCESS, AND AUSTRIAN ECONOMICS: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF LUDWIG VON MISES 1, 
3-4 (Israel M. Kirzner ed., 1982); see also Jack High, Alertness and Judgment: Comment on 
Kirzner, in METHOD, PROCESS AND AUSTRIAN ECONOMICS: ESSAYS IN HONOR OR LUDWIG 
VON MISES, supra, at 161, 167; see supra notes 133-37. 
 272. See id. 
 273. See id. 
 274. See Wonnell, supra note 253, at 528-30; see also KIRZNER, supra note 132, at 148-
49, 158, 175-80. 
 275. Id. Note: this specifically excludes windfall profits due to luck. KIRZNER, supra 
note 132, at 177-80. 
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voided under the defense of mistake.276 If the information is not a 
product of entrepreneurship, then the marginal value of encouragement 
is insignificant and does not outweigh the inefficient contract277—so the 
contract should be voided under the defense of mistake.278  
 Furthermore, Austrians are skeptical of a judge’s ability to accu-
rately reassess the values of the conditions of the contract. Their 
skepticism is due to their strict adherence to the principle that the 
value of the conditions is only measured subjectively by the parties 
and the inability of any individual actor to decipher the true market 
value.279 Austrian economists could also rely upon this doctrine to 
undermine any defense of mistake. 
 In the area of defense of mistake contract law, the Chicago 
school’s jurisprudence would not provide a great deal of protection for 
the natural freedom to contract. The Austrian school’s jurisprudence 
also does not offer a rigorous defense of this application of the free-
dom, but it provides slightly more than the Chicago school. 
3.   Fraud and Force 
 The defense of fraud is applicable when a false material assertion 
is knowingly made and the other party relies upon it.280 The defense 
of force, which is also known as physical duress, is applicable when 
physical threat compels a party to assent.281 The Lockean natural 
rights position regarding fraud and force is that they are a legitimate 
and necessary legal defense.282 Fraud, at first glance, might not seem 
the same as force, but philosophically they are identical in principle. 
Just as the use of force negates the ability of the party to voluntarily 
consent or refrain from consenting, the use of fraud undermines the 
consent which is at the core of contract. When fraud occurs, what the 
party was consenting to is, in actuality, not the actual conditions of 
                                                                                                                     
 276. Wonnell, supra note 253, at 528-30; see KIRZNER, supra note 132, at 148-49, 158, 
175-80. 
 277. See sources cited supra note 276. 
 278. See sources cited supra note 276. 
 279. See supra note 142. 
 280. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 162, 164 (1981). 
 281. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 172 (1965). 
 282. FRIED, supra note 68, at 80; see also id. at 22-24. “The person who disregards 
me . . . who takes account of my individuality—my thinking, reason, judgment—and forces 
me to bend my will to his violates my liberty. His plan depends on the fact that I have 
plans, and he makes me make his plans my plans. . . . Consider two opposite ways in which 
we take into account other persons and their distinct capacities as individuals: we can co-
operate with them or we can coerce them. . . . In cooperating we elicit choices by inviting 
the other to join in our choices, to make our choice his. Coercion can be made to look like 
cooperation—the offer you can not refuse.” Id. at 22-24. 
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the contract.283 To undermine the ability to refrain from assenting is 
a violation of the Lockean natural right to autonomy of one’s mind.284 
 Fraud is a valid legal defense according to the Chicago school.285 
In the Chicago school, the underlying reason why contracts are 
Pareto efficient is because both parties enter into the contract with 
full rationality and high levels of knowledge and conclude that with 
this transaction they will be better off.286 Because actors have perfect 
information, these exchanges represent the exact level of utility each 
actor receives from the exchange.287 If fraud occurs, then this neces-
sarily distorts the information possessed by the parties and skews 
the valuations of the exchanging parties. Each exchange no longer is 
commenced on high levels of information and the utility maximizing 
outcome is no longer reached. 
 According to the Austrian school, fraud is conceptually much like 
mistake except that whereas mistake is reasonably rectified through 
good entrepreneurship, fraud is not.288 As under most of the previous 
scenarios, Austrians do not dispute the Chicago analysis that a lack 
of information leads to inefficient, non-pareto superior transac-
tions.289 In the case of force and fraud, the Austrians agree with the 
Chicago conclusion to recognize the legal defenses.290 The Austrian 
school recognizes these defenses because it is concluded that entre-
preneurship could not reasonably anticipate and counteract fraud or 
avoid force.291 Proceeding upon a fact related by the other party is a 
necessary part of the transaction. If the facts presented by the other 
party could not be relied upon, the necessary double-checking would 
require an unnecessarily large amount of resources. 
 By recognizing the legal defense of fraud and force, both schools 
protect the Lockean natural right for autonomy of one’s mind in the 
process of determining whether to assent or refrain from assenting to 
the contract. 
4.   Unconscionability 
 The defense of unconscionability can be asserted when the terms 
of a contract are harsh, unfair, or unduly favorable to one of the par-
                                                                                                                     
 283. Id. “Fraud involves a similarly indirect use of force: it consists of obtaining mate-
rial values without their owner’s consent, under false pretenses or false promises.” AYN 
RAND, The Nature of Government, in THE VIRTUE OF SELFISHNESS 144, 150-51 (1964). 
 284. See id. 
 285. POSNER, supra note 89, at 113.  
 286. See supra notes 147-49. 
 287. See id. 
 288. See KIRZNER, supra note 132, at 217. 
 289. See ROTHBARD, supra note 106, at 19-20, 85-87; supra notes 137-39, 154-55. 
 290. See KIRZNER, supra note 132.  
 291. Id. 
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ties in light of the relevant market conditions.292 This can occur when 
the price is inferior to that of the market, when the terms are at 
market price but that market price is monopolistic, or because there 
were harsh nonprice terms.293 The case of monopoly has previously 
been dealt with, so only contracts with terms inferior to market price 
and contracts with harsh nonprice terms will be addressed here.  
 The Lockean natural rights position regarding unconscionability 
is that since the terms were negotiated voluntarily, they must be en-
forced.294 One party may not breach terms that he voluntarily agreed 
to because he no longer wants to follow through with the contract.295 
The only exception would be for agreements that the party could not 
say “no”—making his agreement not truly consensual.296 Such an ex-
ception would only be realized for essential items for which there is 
of only one source—for example, where there is only one source of 
food. If the item is essential, then the consumer can not say “no.” If 
there is a suitable substitute, though, then there is no longer a true 
monopoly and this exception would no longer apply. There is also, ar-
guably, an exception for contractual terms which an individual did 
not use his cognition in agreeing to. If the conditions were “agreed to” 
simply in passing, reflexively, or without some degree of contempla-
tion it could be said that the agreement to those terms is not a prod-
uct of the individual and he therefore is not bound by it.297 
 The Chicago school recognizes a limited application of the common 
law defense of unconscionability.298 The premise of the doctrine as the 
                                                                                                                     
 292. U.C.C. §2-302 (2005) (amended 2003); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 
208 (1981). 
 293. See generally id. 
 294. See supra notes 68-70, 74-75 and accompanying text. 
 295. Id. 
 296. An inequity in bargaining power does not preclude you from saying “no” and 
hence does not invalidate consent. It might reduce the desirability of the terms you come to 
agreement on, but this does not undermine the voluntariness. 
 297. See Richard Craswell, Remedies when Contracts Lack Consent: Autonomy and In-
stitutional Competence, 33 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 209 (1995); Richard Craswell, Property 
Rules and Liability Rules in Unconscionability and Related Doctrines, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 
(1993). This exception for form contracts would be most applicable to a Rand-like origin of 
one’s rights to contract. Because the Randian story of the origin or rights is that they de-
rive from rational thought, an act such as reflexively signing a form contract which is not 
based upon rational though is, arguably, not binding. But see Randy E. Barnett, Consent-
ing to Form Contracts, 71 FORD. L. REV. 627, 634-36 (2002) (Barnett argues that under his 
theory, which makes contracts binding through consent, in most cases there is not a problem en-
forcing form contracts. This is in contrast to Fried’s theory, which makes contract binding as a 
promise, where there may be much more room for not enforcing form contracts.).  
 298. The school recognized the doctrine as an extension of fraud, failure to disclose, 
frustration of purpose, and mutual mistake. ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND 
ECONOMICS 189-91 (2d ed. 1997). These are all applications where information and/or ra-
tionality is imperfect. See Richard Craswell, Freedom of Contact, in CHICAGO LECTURES IN 
LAW AND ECONOMICS 81, 88-95 (ERIC A. POSNER ed., 2000). The school does not apply the 
doctrine to terms that provide large profit to either bargainer, however. See infra note 302 
and accompanying text. 
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Chicago school applies it is that the actors have made a decision with 
poor information.299 This transaction must therefore be below Pareto 
efficiency and, according to the Chicago school, should not be en-
forced.300 Instead, the transaction should be negated so that a more 
efficient transaction based upon more complete information instead 
can be undertaken.301 However, according to the Chicago school the 
doctrine should never be used simply to eliminate contract terms 
that provide large returns to the seller.302 If these terms reflect the 
accurate rate of risk then they should be enforced. 
 The Austrian school does not recognize a defense of unconscion-
ability for terms inferior to the market price.303 The primary reason 
that the Austrians do not recognize the defense is that they do not 
operate under the assumptions that individual actors are fully ra-
tional or have high and static levels of information.304 Instead, the 
Austrian school holds that rationality is a learned trait.305 Making ac-
tors realize the consequence of their decisions makes them more ra-
tional actors and ultimately contributors to a marketplace that facili-
tates efficient transactions and thus contributors to the market’s ac-
curate valuation of goods.306 Alternatively, letting actors “off the 
hook” fails to encourage rational decision-making and does not ad-
vance long-term efficiency.307 
 Additionally, the Austrians do not recognize the defense of uncon-
scionability because they do not believe that an economist can accu-
rately measure an individual actor’s subjective value of a good.308 The 
Austrians’ strict adherence to subjective valuation, along with their 
denial of the economist’s ability to make cardinal measurements, re-
sults in an inability to determine what the actor’s subjective value of 
the item was or to make any interpersonal comparison of utility.309 
                                                                                                                     
 299. See Craswell, supra note 298, at 88-95. The school also applies the doctrine in cer-
tain cases of duress, fraud, and necessity, but that is not the specific application or interest 
here. See Richard Epstein, Unconscionability: A Critical Reappraisal, 18 J.L. & ECON. 293, 
295-300 (1975). 
 300. See Craswell, supra note 298, at 88-95. However, Craswell accurately notes that 
in the real-life application the substitute would have to be shown to be more efficient. Id. 
at 96-98. While discussing unconscionability, Chicago scholars seem to invariably leave out 
of the specific topic of actors with bad information and/or bad rationality. See, e.g., Epstein, 
supra note 299; Posner, supra note 89, at 126-30. 
 301. See Craswell, supra note 298, at 88-95; see supra notes 88-89, 147-50 and accom-
panying text. 
 302. See POSNER, supra note 89, at 129; Epstein, supra note 299, at 93, 305-15. 
 303. See Wonnell, supra note 253, at 535-42. 
 304. See id.; supra notes 132, 137-39 and accompanying text. 
 305. See Wonnell, supra note 253, at 518-21; supra notes 132, 137-39 and accompany-
ing text. 
 306. See id. 
 307. See THOMAS SOWELL, KNOWLEDGE AND DECISIONS 110-11 (1996). 
 308. See supra notes 90, 97. 
 309. See id.; supra note 142. 
2007]                          MORAL DUTY  537 
 
 Finally, the Austrians do not recognize the defense of unconscion-
ability because even if it were possible for an economist to measure 
and predict an individual’s subjective valuation, Austrians do not be-
lieve it possible for a judge to obtain and analyze the information in a 
market as accurately as the market would itself because a judge is 
only a single actor.310 In contrast to a judicial edict altering the sales 
price, if the profits generated are greater than the margin, then en-
trepreneurs will move in to capture that profit because they are the 
most sensitive measuring tool in an open market.311 The possibility of 
a judge incorrectly determining that the price paid was above the 
true market price would have the effect of negating the market’s self-
correcting mechanism and decreasing the availability of those goods 
to the consumers.312 
 In this area of contract law, the Chicago school’s jurisprudence 
provides some conflict with the Lockean freedom to contract. The 
Austrian school, on the other hand, is consistent in upholding 
Lockean freedom to contract.  
 As a general principle, the jurisprudence of each school protects 
the natural freedom to contract. This is exemplified by the schools’ 
upholding of the principles of freedom to contract in the cases of 
minimum wage, product regulations, and pension statutes, under 
which a large number of contract issues fall. However, the exceptions 
analyzed show that the Chicago school is less consistent than the 
Austrian school in protecting the Lockean freedom to contract. 
The jurisprudence of the Austrian school is not perfect at protect-
ing the Lockean freedom to contract, but its methodology is thor-
ough nonetheless. 
V.   SYNTHESIS AND CONCLUSIONS 
 It is desirable for individuals to interact in a society of law. But, 
such law is, by definition, coercive.313 In order to justify this coercion, 
there must be a moral justification for that law. If there is a legiti-
mate and compelling justification for the law, then there is a moral 
duty to obey the law. 
 The most common methods of establishing a moral duty to obey 
the law, such as consent, are either fictional or fail. Instead, it is pos-
sible to establish a moral duty to obey the law to the degree that the 
law embodies procedural assurances for the protection of justice. The 
                                                                                                                     
 310. Supra note 142. 
 311. Ellig, supra note 171, at 244-45. 
 312. See SOWELL, supra note 307, at 169. “The costs of an industry are difficult—if not 
impossible—for third parties to determine. . . . [C]osts are foregone options—and options 
are always prospective. . . . Government regulations and their estimates of ‘cost’ are based 
on objective statistical data on actual outlays.” Id. 
 313. See supra introduction to Part II. 
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moral duty imposed through this method is not a nominal “yes or no” 
scale, but rather a gradient one. 
 The Chicago and Austrian schools of law and economics both pro-
vide for a jurisprudence based on economic efficiency. In this respect, 
the policies of the schools are procedural assurances of an outcome. 
To the extent that each school’s procedures provide for the protec-
tion of justice, a legal system based upon them is owed a moral 
duty of obedience. 
 Justice is the protection of Lockean natural rights. Lockean natu-
ral rights derive from the ownership of one’s own body. From that 
single right derives the right to the process and product of one’s mind 
and the right to ownership of property created from resources in the 
state of nature. In order to respect those rights, the freedom from 
contract and the freedom to contract must be fully protected. 
 The Austrian school provides a very high amount of protection for 
Lockean natural rights. The school’s general doctrine provides 
sweeping protections for freedom from contract and freedom to con-
tract. When case studies of doctrines within those two categories are 
examined, the Austrian school almost universally protects those 
freedoms. There are a few examples where the school’s policy does 
not provide complete protection for natural rights, such as some in-
stances of mistake and a very few instances of impracticability, but 
overall there is a very high level of protection for natural rights. 
 The Chicago school provides a moderate amount of protection for 
Lockean natural rights. The school’s general doctrines also provide 
sweeping protections for freedom from contract and freedom to con-
tract, such as opposing minimum wage laws, collective bargaining 
statutes, mandatory pension statutes, insurance regulation, and 
antidiscrimination laws. However, when case studies of doctrines 
that fall within those two categories are examined, it is observed that 
the Chicago school does not provide as sweeping a level of protection 
as it first seems. The Chicago school is most deficient in the case 
studies within freedom from contract, failing to protect Lockean 
natural rights under either monopoly antitrust law or eminent do-
main law. However, as these case studies are the exception rather 
than the norm, they should not be over emphasized—the cliché “don't 
miss the forest for the trees” resonates. 
 From these observations, it can be concluded that a jurisprudence 
based upon Austrian law and economics would be owed a high moral 
duty of obedience to the law. The Austrian system is not perfect in 
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protecting natural rights, so the moral duty is not as high as if consent 
had been given, but the duty owed would be very high nonetheless.314 
 A jurisprudence based upon Chicago law and economics would not 
be owed as high a moral duty as the Austrian school. A Chicago-
based legal system is marked by too many instances where the indi-
vidual’s natural rights are actively undermined, such as monopoly, 
eminent domain, and much of unconscionability, mistake and im-
practicability. However, because the general doctrine is extremely 
protective and is applicable to most cases, the moral duty owed would 
be relatively high. For purposes of perspective, a Chicago-based sys-
tem would almost certainly offer a greater level of protection for 
Lockean natural rights than any modern government and, hence 
would be owed a greater moral duty of obedience. 
                                                                                                                     
 314. It would be unwise to dismiss a system because it is not perfect. If a particular ju-
risprudence provides the great benefit of being able to bring individuals out of the state of 
nature through moral methods while also providing great increases in utility, it should not 
be condemned for a small number of flaws. In the words of Justice Janice Rodgers Brown, 
“The question is not whether we are perfect, but whether our regime is reasonably 
good. . . . Perfection cannot be achieved, what we strive for is the best for human liberty.” 
Justice Janice Rodgers Brown, Address Before the Federalist Society 2006 Leadership 
Conference (July 15, 2006). Also, as was discussed previously as a principle of Austrian 
economics, the true value of an option is in comparison to the alternatives. Therefore, if the 
Austrian system is the most effective method to achieve our goals, it should not be dis-
missed. See generally Arneson, supra note 40, at 96 (Arneson’s system of legitimacy, which 
I have stated is principally very similar to the one used in this Article, determines the le-
gitimacy of government upon which system is the most effective at protecting fundamental 
rights. A system that is not perfect, but is still the most effective, is still legitimate, that is 
until a more effective one is developed. Of note, building on Locke’s theory that one would 
not give up more rights than he had in the state of nature, in order to be legitimate even 
the best system would still have to meet this baseline of rights protection in order to be 
considered legitimate.) Finally, George Smith, an initial developer of this methodology, 
succinctly addressed this issue of imperfection: 
Infallible procedures, however, are not available to fallible beings, so it is not 
surprising that we will inevitably fall short of . . . “ideal.” (It is “very unlikely,” 
[a critic] notes, “that any procedure will ever attain such perfection in the real 
world.” For “very unlikely” I would substitute “impossible,” and I must wonder 
why an unattainable goal is regarded as perfection.” 
Smith, Reply to Critics, supra note 59, at 465. 
